Pepperdine University

Pepperdine Digital Commons
Theses and Dissertations
2021

A contemporary study on the impact of regulations on business
performance
Brian C. Mulligan

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/etd
Part of the Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons, Economics Commons,
and the Public Policy Commons

Pepperdine University
Graziadio School of Business

A CONTEMPORARY STUDY ON THE IMPACT OF REGULATIONS
ON BUSINESS PERFORMANCE

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment
of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

by
Brian C. Mulligan
August, 2021

Nelson Granados, Ph.D – Dissertation Chair

This dissertation, written by

Brian C. Mulligan

under the guidance of a Dissertation Committee and approved by its members, has been
submitted to and accepted by the Pepperdine Graziadio Business School in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

Doctoral Dissertation Committee:

Professor Nelson Granados, Ph.D., Supervisor, and Chairperson
Professor Ann E. Feyerherm, Ph.D., Secondary Academic Advisor
Professor James G. Ellis, M.B.A., External Reviewer

© Copyright by Brian C. Mulligan 2021
All Rights Reserved

TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................................................... VIII
LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................................................... IX
VITA .............................................................................................................................................. X
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................ XI
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 1
OVERVIEW .................................................................................................................................... 1
PROBLEMS ADDRESSED ................................................................................................................ 3
RESEARCH QUESTIONS ................................................................................................................. 6
SIGNIFICANCE OF PROPOSED RESEARCH ....................................................................................... 6
CHAPTER 2: OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH AREA AND APPROACH ..................... 8
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................. 8
FOUNDATIONAL LITERATURE REVIEW.......................................................................................... 8
JUSTIFICATION OF THE RESEARCH AGENDA ................................................................................ 10
CHAPTER 3: CALL FOR RESEARCH: TOWARDS THE RIGHT-SIZING OF
REGULATIONS FOR BUSINESS PERFORMANCE ........................................................... 12
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................... 12
PURPOSE OF THE PAPER .............................................................................................................. 15
LITERATURE REVIEW .................................................................................................................. 16
EVIDENCE ON THE PATH TO AN ADMINISTRATIVE STATE ........................................................... 18
THE IMPACT OF TRAILS ON BUSINESS PERFORMANCE .............................................................. 22

FRAMEWORKS, PROPOSITIONS, AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS....................................................... 26
Proposition 1 .......................................................................................................................... 27
Proposition 2 .......................................................................................................................... 28
Proposition 3 .......................................................................................................................... 28
Proposition 4 .......................................................................................................................... 29
Proposition 5 .......................................................................................................................... 31
Proposition 6 .......................................................................................................................... 32
Proposition 7 .......................................................................................................................... 34
Proposition 8 .......................................................................................................................... 39
Proposition 9 .......................................................................................................................... 40
CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................................................. 41
CHAPTER 4: THE ROLE OF THE BUSINESS EXECUTIVE ON RIGHT-SIZING OF
REGULATIONS FOR BUSINESS PERFORMANCE ........................................................... 44
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................... 44
PURPOSE OF THE PAPER .............................................................................................................. 47
FOUNDATIONAL THEORY ON THE BUSINESS IMPACT OF TRAILS............................................... 48
Theoretical Framework .......................................................................................................... 48
Consequential Knowledge and Mistake Management ........................................................... 49
The Pretense of Knowledge and Knowledge Problem ........................................................... 49
Knowledge Creates Wealth .................................................................................................... 50
TRAILS Impacts Knowledge .................................................................................................. 50
Macroeconomics vs. Microeconomics ................................................................................... 51
Micro Business Economics Concerning TRAILS ................................................................... 52
v

Right-sizing Defined ............................................................................................................... 53
RESEARCH DESIGN AND APPROACH ........................................................................................... 53
DATA COLLECTION METHODS AND INSTRUMENTS ..................................................................... 54
MEASURES AND DATA ANALYSIS ............................................................................................... 54
Process ................................................................................................................................... 55
Coding .................................................................................................................................... 55
Process Flow .......................................................................................................................... 57
Study Population and Sample ................................................................................................ 59
ASSUMPTIONS AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS.......................................................................... 60
PRELIMINARY FINDINGS ............................................................................................................. 61
Implication for the Foundational Starting Point ................................................................... 61
Structure of Presentation from Exploratory through to Empirical Findings ........................ 61
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS .................................................................................................................. 62
Type 1 Umpire Effects ............................................................................................................ 64
Type 2 Cobra Effects .............................................................................................................. 65
Type 3 Broken Window Effects .............................................................................................. 68
Type 4 Chillax Effects ............................................................................................................ 74
IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY AND PRACTICE................................................................................ 74
THEORETICAL PROPOSITIONS...................................................................................................... 75
Proposition 1 .......................................................................................................................... 75
Proposition 2 .......................................................................................................................... 76
Proposition 3 .......................................................................................................................... 77
Proposition 4 .......................................................................................................................... 78

vi

IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE ..................................................................................................... 78
Implication 1 .......................................................................................................................... 78
Implication 2 .......................................................................................................................... 80
Implication 3 .......................................................................................................................... 81
Implication 4 .......................................................................................................................... 82
LIMITATIONS............................................................................................................................... 82
IMPLICATION FOR FUTURE RESEARCH ........................................................................................ 83
CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................................................. 83
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................. 87
OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS ............................................................................................................. 87
ABBO Model .......................................................................................................................... 88
TRAILS Macro-View .............................................................................................................. 89
Matrix ..................................................................................................................................... 91
FINAL THOUGHTS ....................................................................................................................... 92
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................ 95
APPENDIX A: IRB APPROVAL LETTER ........................................................................... 120
APPENDIX B: RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS ...................................................................... 121
APPENDIX C: METHODS AND PROCESS ......................................................................... 124
APPENDIX D: CODING .......................................................................................................... 129

vii

LIST OF TABLES
Table 1. Annual TRAILS Cost for Federal, State, Municipal, and U.N. systems……………….19
Table 2. Details Concerning Elite Executives Interviewed……………………………………...60
Table 3. Call for Research: Propositions and Research Questions……………………………….90
Table 4. Principles, Theoretical Propositions, and Practical Implications……………………….92

viii

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1. Qualitative Theoretical Structure for the Literature Review……………………………9
Figure 2. Impact of Economic Liberty…………………………………………………………...13
Figure 3. Framework on Impact of TRAILS on Business Performance…………………………24
Figure 4. TRAILS Right-Sizing Model……………………………………………………….....27
Figure 5. Regulatory Action and Inaction and the Impact on Business Performance…………...33
Figure 6. Constitution-based and Contemporary TRAILS Paradigm for TRAILS……………..37
Figure 7. 2000 Years of Economic History in One Chart………………………………………..46
Figure 8. Theoretical, Qualitative Structure for the TRAILS Ecosystem ……………………….48
Figure 9. Methods, Process, and Analysis Flow Chart…………………………………………..56
Figure 10. Coding Process Flow…………………………………………………………………58
Figure 11. The Impact of TRAILS Action, Inaction, and Uneven Action on Performance……..63
Figure 12. Wrong-sized TRAILS Suggest an Adverse Impact on Performance………………...88
Figure 13. Codes for Each Cycle……………………………………………………………….129

ix

VITA
Brian C. Mulligan is an international executive who has held positions of Chairman, ViceChairman, CEO, COO, CFO, EVP, and SVP of major multinational companies, world-class
advisory firms, and private equity firms. Positions held include Vice Chairman of Deutsche Bank,
EVP/CFO of Seagram’s (Fortune 50 Company), Co-Chairman of Universal Pictures, COO of
Universal Studios, Chairman of FOX Broadcasting and Cable, EVP/SVP of Strategic Planning
and Corporate Development for MCA Inc. and Universal Studios Inc., CEO of Universal
Television, Senior Executive Advisor for Boston Consulting Group, and Senior Manager for Price
Waterhouse. He has served on numerous boards such as IAC. During his career, Mulligan has been
instrumental in over $200 billion of transactions.
Dr. Mulligan is an expert in domestic and international financing, operations, and
restructurings for long-term, value-creating growth. Examples of operating performance
improvements include over $2 billion in operating improvements, reengineering Universal
Pictures from the 6th rated studio to 1st, and over a $1 billion turnaround in operating cash flow.
He took Deutsche Bank from 8th to 1st in Media and Telecom and 12th to 1st in Entertainment
Underwriting League Tables over three years.
Dr. Mulligan is a featured industry and academic speaker and a published writer with over
20 articles on global businesses, entertainment, sports, and emerging businesses. He was featured
as "One of the 25 Most Powerful People in Hollywood" by Premiere Magazine, "One of the Ten
Most Prominent Bankers in Entertainment" by the L.A. Business Journal, and "One of the Three
Leading Investment Bankers on Emerging Business Models" by TMT Quarterly/Law 360. Dr.
Mulligan earned a BS from USC, an MBA from UCLA, and a Doctorate from Pepperdine. He is
a member of FINRA, SPIC, AICPA, California Society of CPAs, and Beta Gamma Sigma.
x

ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines Nobel Prize Laureate Hayek's ominous warning that economic liberty
in the U.S. is at risk, due to regulations, of becoming an unplanned administrative state. The
research seeks to understand the effects of regulations on business performance and how to rightsize them for a healthy business environment. These objectives are accomplished with two
papers: (1) a macro cross-discipline literature review and call for research on the impact of
regulations on business performance, and (2) a qualitative grounded theory study from
interviews from elite business executives on their perspectives on the impact of regulations on
business performance. The findings lead to principles of the impact of regulations have on
business performance, theoretical implications, and practical implications towards right-sizing of
regulations. The government's role as the umpire is paramount, including acting on appropriate
regulations to create a healthy business environment, and avoiding regulations that pick winners
and losers. Regulations should be vetted against unintended consequences that may create an
unhealthy business environment. Future research directions and limitations are discussed.

Keywords: capitalism, regulations, business performance, collectivism, innovation,
unseen consequences, government, Hayek, Bastiat, Schumpeter
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Overview
This dissertation showcases a research agenda on the effect of regulation on business
performance. The agenda aims to tie business performance outcomes to the business
environment influenced and created by business regulations. For that purpose, I propose two
studies. Study 1 is a call for research on whether businesses in the U.S. are operating under a
cloud of a collectivist state due to the considerable amount of business regulations (Dean, 2020;
Hayek, 1943, 1960; Stigler, 1964, 1971, 1983; Strassel, 2019; Whitehead, 2016, 2019). Study 2
is a micro-level empirical study of the impact of regulations on business performance, based on
interviews with senior executives. Study 2 aims to understand how to right-size regulations to
create a healthy environment for business performance.
I am motivated by my own experience as an industry executive. The first example that
comes to mind is the Tax Reform Act of 1986. I was just out of undergraduate university and
spent much of my time understanding business taxes and their importance to business
(approximately 40% of bottom line). I was naïve and astonished that the government, without
much warning, through its actions could upend the business environment into an atmosphere of
uncertainty, effectively rendering many existing business strategies obsolete. The Act caused the
most significant single-day market crash, unemployment rose, and the savings and loan industry
was wiped out, giving a monopoly to banks (Bartlett, 2011; Bernie, 2011).
In the same way government regulations can affect the business environment, the lack of
regulations can also. An example is the deregulation of the entertainment industry, first
eliminating the fairness doctrine in 1987, which went into effect in 2011 (Mascaro, 2013;
Valenti, 1983). The fairness doctrine required issues of public importance to be presented in an
1

honest, equitable, and balanced fashion. Another deregulatory action was the elimination of the
Financial and Syndication Rule. Since 1971, due to monopolistic and predatory actions,
broadcasters could not own a financial interest or backend interest in entertainment
programming. Creative talent, agencies, television, film, and independent producers were against
the repeal as doing so would make all entertainment production entities and creative talent
effectively employees of broadcasters. The rules were repealed in 1993. Over time, broadcasters
leveraged their newly created monopolistic position, resulting in the industry (with formerly
hundreds of business entities) being reduced to six conglomerates that controlled 95% of the
entertainment and media market.
My last personal example is a cautionary tale of the consequences of both action and
inaction by the government as related to the emergence of Amazon. My firm’s book publishing
company sold books to Amazon when they started in 1995 at the exact cost as any book retailer.
Amazon seemed at a significant competitive disadvantage to its competition since it did not have
retail outlets and instead assumed a more expensive distribution due to the enormous cost of
delivering books to individuals. We had to make Amazon pay cash up front before delivering
their books, as their business model did not seem sustainable (Golomb, 2014; Khan, 2016, 2018).
I was perplexed noticing that at that time, unlike most start-ups, upfront cash was never a
problem for Amazon. It took Amazon 20 years before its aggregate profits were more than its
total losses (Khan, 2016, 2018). Over time, it became known that a government venture capital
fund underwrote much of Amazon’s cash needs (Upbin, 2013). It also became known that they
benefited from Intel agency technology, helped from regulations that allowed them to pay no
sales tax, pay virtually no income tax, and pay less than half what competitors pay for postage
and delivery (Baugh et al., 2019; Grover, 2019; Russel et al., 2018; White, 2019). Moreover,
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Amazon benefitted from governmental intertwinements (Bandler et al., 2019; Canter & Gomez,
2017), generous government contracts when Amazon ran low on funds (Galloway, 2017; Levine,
2018; Zhu, 2019), and from a friendly Department of Justice (DOJ) that looked the other way on
numerous anti-trust acquisitions and complaints (Akerlof & Romer, 1993; Khan 2016 & 2018;
Mitchell, 2014; White, 2019).
Amazon went on to play a significant role in bankrupting bookstores (harmed our
publishing company), music stores (damaged our music and DVD business), and impaired most
retailers. All of this led to a material amount of unemployment or underemployment (Grover,
2019; LaVecchia & Mitchell, 2016; Mitchell, 2014; Van Ullen & Germain, 2002). Amazon is
also now one of the largest polluters (Nguyen, 2018). Amazon is an example of the adverse,
unintended, hidden consequences of both government action (Hargadon & Kenny, 2012; Khan &
Vaheesan, 2017; Russel et al., 2018) and inaction by not demanding online retailers to collect
sales tax initially (Kenny, 2019; LaVecchia & Mitchell, 2016).
Problems Addressed
A country's regulatory environment can affect the overall capacity of firms to generate
economic rents enough to allow for the betterment of and optimization of business and society.
Economists considered two broad governmental regulatory models to organize the business
environment: collectivism and individualism (D’Amato, 2018; Rand et al., 1986; Read, 2018;
Stoller, 2019; West, 2013, 2019; Younkins, 2005). Collectivism uses central government
planning and stakeholder primacy, operating regulations, and reporting requirements to organize
business to steer the collective economy and society as a whole (de La Boétie, 1553; Marx &
Engles, 1848; Marz, 1991; Osborne, 1992, 2010; Wolff, 2016). Individualism uses shareholder
primacy based on the sovereignty of self-reliance and self-interest of the individual shareholders
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and only the minimum amount of regulation for capital formation, capital markets, and to create
competitive and fair markets (Hayek, 1943, 1945, 1956, 1960, 1991, 2013; Friedman, 1962,
1970; Nozick, 1974; Read, 2018; Reisman, 2012; Weber, 1922, 1930).
Because of the integrated, interrelated, and synonymic nature of governmental language
and action upon business, in this study, any governmentally imposed friction costs on business
are considered part of the regulatory phenomena to be examined (Peikoff, 1983 & 1993;
Reisman, 1979; Strassel, 2019). Regulations for this study include Tax, Regulation,
Assessments, Intervention, Legal, and Subsidies (TRAILS). To avoid the fallacy of composition,
the totality of the TRAILS ecosystem will be examined (Peikoff, 1983, 1993).
Governments use regulation to affect business, economic, and societal matters. But
governments can also impact results through inaction (Coase, 1960; Stiglitz, 2015), by not
creating laws that allow for fair capital formation and competitive markets in evolving and ongoing business environments, or by not enforcing existing laws that allow for such. Further,
governments can harm the business environment by proactive intervention or investment in
private industry (Kahn, 2016; Khan & Vanheesan, 2017; Lavecchia & Mitchell, 2016; Mitchell,
2014; Van Ullen & Germain, 2002).
One of the key drivers of my research is that the exhaustive literature review suggests
there are no meaningful performance measures (Elson et al., 2017), including impacts on society
(Carter, 2018; Goldin, 1992, 2014), innovation (Tsanova & Havenith, 2019), economy (Hannan,
2011, 2013), environment (Bracket, 2019), and stakeholders (Bainbridge, 1993, 2002, 2015,
2019; Lipton, 2017; Lipton & Podolsky, 2019; Reisman, 2012), in which collectivists countries
or companies outperform individualist ones. The very few research reports that suggest
environmental and social pressures on corporations provide a modest improvement in
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performance measures were paid for by agenda-driven activists (Bainbridge, 1993, 2019;
Broome et al., 2011; Lacasse & Lambert, 2016; Meddaugh, 2017; March & Olsen, 2006;
Reisman, 1979).
There are some signals in the U.S. that over-regulation may be creating a challenging
business environment. Since 1960, regulation has grown from 15% to 45% of GDP
(International Monetary Fund, 2021), which is primarily due to TRAILS (Palmer, 2011, 2013,
2014). Such TRAILS and related costs hamper growth and are a drag on the economy (Campos,
2015; Gordon, 2014; Rothbard, 1959, 2002, 2009; von Mises, 2015). For context and directional
comparison of the 45% of GDP figure, overhead or cost centers of the S&P 1200 is only 5.5%
(Capital IQ, 2021). Also, the government has lost control of its accounting (Priest & Arkin,
2010). The government has misplaced and cannot account for $23 trillion and is not disclosing
liabilities of over $150 trillion (Adams, 2019; Aftergood, 2018; Skidmore & Fitts, 2019;
Skidmore & Kotlikoff, 2019). Further, the government is unable to report data on any of the
generally accepted methods (GAAP, governmental GAAP, cash basis, accrual basis, fair market
value basis, and IAS) (Heiling et al., 2013; Miron & Romer, 1990; Peled, 2011; Priest & Arkin,
2010; Skidmore & Kotlikoff, 2019). This situation is concerning because the loss of transparency
and trust in government are leading indicators of future country-level failure (Omerod, 2019).
Hayek (1943, 1960) argues that an individualist state can be converted into a collectivist
state by increasing unnecessary regulations that, philosophically, pass the delineation line
amount of regulation from individualism to collectivism. This situation is known as regulatory
capture (Stigler, 1964, 1971, 1983), which morphs an individualist state into a collectivist one
through TRAILS. This new state is also referred to as an administrative state, regulatory state, or
bureaucratic state (Hayek, 1943, 1960; Palmer, 2011, 2013, 2014). Schumpeter (1942) observed

5

the seduction of collectivism taking over universities and Europe and warned of the fall of
individualism. Hedges (2009), Stoller (2019), Wolfe (2016), and Stigler (1983) note that the U.S.
has regulated itself out of being an individualist country due to individuals of questionable
quality in government (Hayek, 1943, 1960; Hoppe, 2002; Schumpeter 1942)
It is important to determine if the ominous warnings have come to fruition and
contentions are true. If they are, the rhetorical debates that play themselves out in politics,
mainstream media, and study of individualism vs. collectivism can be disingenuous, divisive,
and counterproductive. Moreover, such polarizing debates are often based on a false dilemma or
correlative-based fallacy, or theories unmoored to reality or rigor (Bastiat, 2007; Coffey et al.,
2016; Dunkelberg, 2017; Gilens & Page, 2014; Hazlitt, 1959, 1988; Murray, 2016; Skidmore &
Kotlikoff, 2019; Strassel, 2019; Whitehead, 2016).
Research Questions
The broad agenda for this research is to understand the impact of TRAILS on business
performance. Specific questions that will be pursued are:
•

On a macro basis, are businesses operating under the right set of regulations for
business performance?

•

On a micro basis, how can regulations be right-sized for a healthy business
environment?

Significance of Proposed Research
Many prominent researchers, philosophers, economists, executives, and certain politicos
view the potential corruption of the individualist state to a collectivist state as the single most
crucial issue facing the U.S. (Allison, 2012, 2014; Hannan, 2011, 2013; Hayek, 1960; Hedges,
2009; Infantino, 2014; Rand et al., 1986; Read, 2018; Rothbard, 1959, 2002b, 2009a, 2009b;
Schumpeter, 1942; Shlaes, 2009, 2013; von Mises, 2015; Whitehead, 2016, 2019). They view
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regulatory capture as the hidden existential threat to U.S. sovereignty, such that TRAILS are
robbing the wealth and future of the hard-working American citizens and their children.
The significance of this research is also due to the unique tripartite analysis filters of the
study. This research will highlight and provide an understanding of the cruciality of the TRAILS
phenomena from three dimensions: macro/micro, a common-sense judgmental vector on the
positive and negative impact on business (not a political right or left dichotomy), and a combined
scholarly and practitioner perspective.
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CHAPTER 2: OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH AREA AND APPROACH
Introduction
A comprehensive and complete review of the literature related to the impact of TRAILS
on business performance necessitates the involvement of disciplines across the business,
economics, law, public policy, and psychology domains. Further, the vastness of the literature
stems from the complexity, quiddity, and impact on winners and losers from each TRAIL
enacted (Ebell & Milloy, 2019; Schuck, 2014; Wilson, 1989; Wilson et al., 2017). Moreover,
there is a nearly immeasurable amount of theoretical and academic scholarly research. This
vastness is due to the philosophical nature of connectedness and intertwinements with how
countries organize commerce and control and steer society.
Foundational Literature Review
To understand the structure of the literature, it is necessary to understand the
philosophical basis of individualism, self-determination, and the law of identity vs. collectivism,
group supremacy, and the truth for the benefit of the group (Elster, 1982; Hayek 1948, 1991,
2013; Herman, 2014; MacDonald, 2018; Nozick, 1974; Peikoff, 1983, 1993; Rand & Peikoff,
1984, 1993, 1999). I have reviewed the economics, finance, legal, tax, accounting, behavioral,
and psychodynamic psychology (i.e., incentives) research to understand how the literature is
structured (Petriglieri et al., 2019; Roe & Lunneborg, 1990).
A qualitative theoretical structure of ‘Antecedents to Beliefs to Behaviors to Outcomes’
(ABBO model) is the framing for this research (Edmondson, 1999) and can be seen pictorially in
Figure 1.
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Figure 1
Qualitative Theoretical Structure for the Literature Review

The framework considers both individualism and collectivism as antecedents, a form of
governance for a nation. Then, beliefs understand TRAILS at the firm structure or operating
level. Beliefs are followed by behaviors driven by TRAILS-induced incentives at the firm level,
also referred to as team behaviors (Edmondson, 1999), and at the individual level. The individual
interprets, evaluates, and internalizes TRAILS, motivating intentional behavior that affects
business performance. The change from that calculus manifests results in outcomes (performance
measures). In aggregate, henceforth, this dynamic theoretical process model is referred to as the
ABBO model. At the A (Antecedents-Philosophy), B (Beliefs-TRAILS), and C (BehaviorsIncentives) levels, there are philosophically two dichotomous research positions that are rooted
in either individualism or collectivism. Often not explicit in existing research is the function
incentives have on behaviors and, thus, outcomes, although it is omnipresent in some form,
especially for individualists (De Bottom, 2016; Weber, 1922, 1930).
The ABBO model is not static. There is dynamism in business that occurs over time or
with new TRAILS. There is a persistent evaluative process of existing TRAILS, as firms
constantly change and refine their beliefs and behaviors based on outcomes. Even antecedents
can change with a new administration and/or personnel. Exogenous and endogenous factors (new
data points) are put into the calculus of prior antecedents, if applicable, and beliefs (intrinsic and
9

extrinsic) are adjusted before determining adjustments to behaviors (incentives) to improve
business outcomes. For individualism, improved outcomes of performance measures are for the
business entity and individuals based on incentives. For collectivism, enhanced outcomes of
performance measures are more equal outcomes for individuals and improvement of outcomes of
performance measures is secondary (Hayek, 1943, 1948; Marx & Engels, 1848; Roth, 2010;
Schumpeter, 1909, 1943; Weber, 1922, 1930).
Justification of the Research Agenda
The broad agenda for this research is to understand the impact of TRAILS on business
performance. I propose two complementary understanding vectors: a macro perspective and a
micro perspective. The dissertation consists of two papers, one for each of these points of view.
The first paper, which is termed the macro study, is based on two discoveries that
emerged from the literature review and exploratory interviews. The first discovery is a
framework I developed to understand the TRAILS phenomena on a macro basis. The second
discovery was that several areas are important, yet under-researched, to fully understand the
current TRAILS environment. An undertaking to research the identified areas goes far beyond
the scope of my proposed dissertation. Therefore, the first paper is a call to the academic and
business community on the critical areas in need of additional research to understand how
TRAILS is impacting business performance using the emerging framework.
The second paper takes a more micro view of the relationship between TRAILS and
business performance. It consists of empirical qualitative research through intensive interviews
of executives (practitioners) to better understand the real-world impact of TRAILS on business
performance at the individual and firm levels. This understanding will be accomplished by
analyzing the data inductively, deductively, and abductively relative to existing theory to provide
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a realistic assessment of the TRAILS phenomena and reconciling connections and
disconnections with existing scholarly work. Finally, the empirical study yields a real-world but
theoretically sound framework to right-size TRAILS towards a favorable business environment.

11

CHAPTER 3: CALL FOR RESEARCH: TOWARDS THE RIGHT-SIZING OF
REGULATIONS FOR BUSINESS PERFORMANCE
Introduction
Certain economists and executives believe that the U.S. is no longer an individualist state
due to regulatory encroachment but rather a collectivist state. Hayek (1943, 1960) warned that
the U.S. could be undermined by regulations and effectively become an unplanned
administrative state. Schumpeter (1942) warned of a similar outcome directionally for the U.S.
Several Nobel prize-winning economists warned of or conceded that the U.S. is now a
collectivist state. An analysis of current source material and original data collection seem to
support face validity to these most ominous prognostications. This paper develops a call for
research to understand contemporary regulatory phenomena on a macro basis, seeking to know
whether the U.S. is already fundamentally (or on the way to) becoming an unplanned
administrative state.
A country's regulatory environment affects firms' overall capacity to generate economic
rents to better and optimize business and society. There are two broad binary governmental
regulatory models to organize the business environment: collectivism and individualism, aka
economic liberty (Hayek, 1943, 1960; Marx & Engels, 1848; Rand et al., 1986; Read, 2018; von
Mises, 2015). Collectivism uses central government planning, stakeholder primacy, operating
regulations, and reporting requirements to organize business to steer the collective economy and
society as a whole (Marx & Engels, 1848; Mitchell, 2019; Soros, 2008; Stiglitz, 2015; Wolff,
2016). Individualism uses shareholder primacy based on the natural law of sovereignty of selfreliance and self-interest of the individual shareholders and only the minimum necessary amount
of regulation for capital formation, capital markets and to create competitive and fair markets
12

(Friedman, 1962, 1970; Hayek, 1943, 1945, 1960; Mitchell, 2020; Read, 2018; Weber, 1922,
1930).
Some argue that individualism is the core of liberty (Smith, 1932) and has created more
economic and civil elevations than all other forms of business governance combined (Boaz,
2015), which is critical for a healthy business environment. Figure 2 shows the impact of
economic liberty on GDP per capita. The term I use most often in this dissertation related to
individualism is economic liberty.
Figure 2
Impact of Economic Liberty

Note. Statistics on World Population, GDP, and Per Capita GDP 1-2008 AD. Groningen, Netherlands: Groningen
Growth and Development Centre, University of Groningen.

Because of the integrated, interrelated, semantic overload, synonymic nature of
governmental language and action upon business, in this study, any governmentally imposed
friction costs on business are considered part of the regulatory phenomena to be examined
(Peikoff, 1983, 1993; Strassel, 2019). This study's consideration of regulations includes tax,
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reporting, assessments, intervention, legal, and subsidies (TRAILS). To avoid the fallacy of
composition, the TRAILS ecosystem's totality will be examined (Peikoff, 1983).
In the literature review on the government’s role in business performance, there was no
evidence-based research on any aspect of U.S. business that collectivist TRAILS have favored.
By comparison, the U.S. business environment is better than other countries by some economic
measures (Appleby, 2010; Elson et al., 2017; Hannan, 2011, 2013; King & Levine, 1993). But
this reality could be a strawman if the U.S. is relatively better off because it is lagging on the
path to becoming an administrative state compared to other countries.
Perhaps a better comparison is the U.S. business environment today as compared to 1960.
In the preponderance of meaningful metrics, the U.S. is worse now than it was in 1960.
Examples are the worldwide standard of living per capita in the U.S., which is down 58%
(Giridharadas, 2018; Hannan, 2011, 2013; Murray, 2016; Stoller, 2019). Some current research
suggests that the U.S. is under or is near financial bankruptcy (Alvaredo et al., 2018; Bandow,
2019; Murray, 2016; Whitehead, 2016, 2019).
On a macro basis, a nation can pretend it does not have problems, but its consequences
cannot be ignored. Before you can solve a problem, three predicate steps are required:
understand the problem, admit the problem exists, and understand its root, symptomatic, and
systemic causes. Then you can investigate solutions. The broad approach pursued in this call for
research will be to find critical research areas to right-size TRAILS (Flynn, 1987; Gwartney et
al., 2018; Jones, 2015; Vásquez & Porc̆nik, 2019) by satisfying the three predicate conditions.
This call for research will focus on the appropriate philosophy governing antecedents for
a healthy business environment. Then, suitable TRAILS believed to manifest that business
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environment can be understood. Using this structure, gaps in enacted TRAILS and
misalignments of TRAILS help identify areas for further research.
Purpose of the Paper
The purpose of this paper is to provide an academic and existential understanding of the
current TRAILS phenomena on a macro basis, based on the working hypotheses from
economists from the 20th century that the U.S. is susceptible and at risk of becoming an
unplanned administrative state. This research intends to provide an aggregate assessment of the
state of the current U.S. business environment and the appropriate role of TRAILS. A set of
models and frameworks based on the literature examined are developed to guide the critical
research questions researched around this phenomenon. These models and frameworks condense
and help visualize a vast amount of complex literature, data, and source material to ease
understanding of how regulatory action and inaction can be favorable or unfavorable to business.
This research seeks to expose gaps to be filled in studying the impact of regulations on
business performance. Pro-regulation and anti-regulation studies have materially different
underlying evidence and methods because they come from diverse and often biased angles
(Delsol et al., 2017; Wheelan, 2013, 2019). Unreconciled underlying evidence and facts portend
any productive discourse to be fruitless. Thus, this paper proposes directions to quantify the costs
and benefits of regulation on business, with specific requests for action on contemporary
regulatory dilemmas. The call for research is motivated by the magnitude of the problem,
disinformation, unsubstantiated rhetoric, epistemological polarity, and the need to infuse
economic perspectives into policy debates.
The call for research will allow the regulatory debate to be elevated to the practical level
to advance toward realistic and actionable research and solutions. This common-sense approach
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will ideally reduce the extreme epistemic polarity of the current general understanding of the
TRAILS phenomena (D’Amato, 2018). The purpose is to propose a research agenda that can
lead to a better business environment. In doing so, competing analyses would not fall prey to
unmoored rhetoric or fallacy of concrete arguments and instead would seek baseline agreement
to represent the business world accurately. This research also seeks to determine if TRAILS'
wrong-sizing is unplanned or based on planned regulatory overreach.
The epistemic polarity in the U.S. political debate has resulted in factional splits. The allencompassing polarity is not merely between collectivists vs. individualists or based on political
affiliation or self-interest groups. But instead, importantly, there exists a division of two realities.
One side trusts experts from academia, media, entertainment, governmental institutions,
unaccountable world organizations, foundations, non-governmental organizations, activists'
organizations, and even celebrities. The other has a deep mistrust and complete skepticism of
these same experts and notables. From a business standpoint, due to TRAILS, the country is at a
pivotal moment in which the two groups face but one unattractive consequence if appropriate
TRAILS actions and inactions are not adopted. Given the present juncture with the global
COVID-19 economic crisis, it is crucial to bridge the two sides to right-size TRAILS for
business performance.
Literature Review
Hayek (1943, 1960, 1979, 2013) predicted the defeated ‘devil’ of collectivism would
gradually and discreetly destroy the state through TRAILS (Carpenter, 2019). Collectivist
propagandists would divert blame to capitalism and businesspeople and manipulate citizens to
demand regulation to control capitalism, resulting in tyranny (Boyack, 2014; Caldwell, 2008;
Crewdson & Treaster, 1977; Reisman, 2012).
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Regulatory usurpation of individualism can occur at the national, firm, or operational
level and are not mutually exclusive (Bainbridge, 1993, 2019; Hoggett, 2006; Lipton, 2017;
Lipton & Podolsky, 2019). Literature on regulatory usurpation suggests that every TRAILS
action has consequences, beneficial or ruinous, intended or unintended, if not immediately, in the
future, and they can be compounding and esoteric (Edwards, 2014; Edwards & Kaeding, 2015;
Schuck, 2014; Wilson, 1989). Thus, it is the essence of the regulatory ecosystem that any
government TRAILS action will asymmetrically impact human activity and, therefore, business
activity (Low & MacMillan, 1988; von Mises, 2016; Wilson, 1989; Wilson et al., 2017).
The regulatory capture can go far beyond observable costs. It includes creating anticompetitive markets by enforcing or not enforcing appropriate TRAILS, all of which lead to
wrong-sized TRAILS. They include public and private partnerships that eliminate competition,
government investment in private companies that increase monopoly power, judicial activism,
bailouts, unfair trade deals, collective bargaining for governmental employees, and tax breaks for
selected entities. These can result in unintended consequences on the business environment and
can potentially stifle commerce by advertently or inadvertently having the government picking
winners and losers rather than the market (Allison, 2012, 2014; Bastiat, 2007; Blumenthal, 1984;
Blumenthal & Newman, 2015; Cudenec, 2020; Dharapala et al., 2019; Friedman, 1957, 1962,
1970; Hockerts & Wüstenhagen, 2010; Hargadon & Kenney; 2012; LaVecchia & Mitchell,
2016; Levy & Reynolds, 2000; Miron, 2010; Rothbard, 1959, 2002a, 2002b, 2007, 2009;
Schuck, 2014; Strassel, 2019; von Mises, 2015, 2016).
How does all this lead to a regulatory state? The vast bulk of TRAILS and related direct
and indirect costs can grow by individual regulatory actions, leading to an increase in reporting
requirements, judicial activism, unaccountable and less competent legislative body, sanctioned
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activism, creation of oversight agencies, sanctioned oversight, enforcement of self-regulatory
bodies, the unelected world governing bodies, uneven application and enforcement of regulations
(Bainbridge, 2019; Cogan, 2017; Kadlec, 2011; Palmer, 2013, 2014; Shlaes, 2009; Stigler, 1983;
Strassel, 2019; Stoller, 2019). Therefore, in this call for research, the inquiry areas get back to
the basics of natural law, economic liberty, free markets, entrepreneurial innovation, and
competition as foundations to advance theory and research on how to right-size TRAILS for
business performance.
Evidence on the Path to an Administrative State
Some argue that wrong-sized TRAILS could drive government debt, relative to economic
growth, at the Federal, state, municipal, and U.N. systems level to unsustainable ratios (Cogen,
2017; Hayek, 1943, 1960, 1988; Hazlitt, 1959, 1988; Hoppe, 2002, 2019; Rothbard, 1990, 2007;
Schumpeter, 1942; von Mises, 1940, 1957, 1961, 1981, 2005, 2007). Gattuso and Katz (2016a,
2016b) noted that from 2010 to 2015 alone, the federal government added nearly 50,000 new
rules to the Federal Registry, and that excluded states, agencies, and self-regulatory
organizations.
There are statistics on the impact of TRAILS that raise the flag and signal the importance
of addressing the issue in a non-partisan, empirical manner (Table 1). Dawson and Seater (2013),
using the percentage ratio of TRAILS to GDP in 1948 vs. the reported proportion of TRAILS to
GDP through 2012, calculated TRAILS current and cumulative impact on GDP. In 2012, the
difference was $38 trillion, or $150 thousand per adult per annum. The estimated cost was $421
trillion over the last 50 years.
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Table 1
Annual TRAILS Cost Estimates for Federal, State, Municipal, and U.N. Systems
Impact of TRAILS measures
Category
Journal of Economic Growth, Dawson & Seater (2013)
Opportunity Cost Per Year Using Impairment of Growth
Per Capita
Estimated aggregrate since 1970 - using reported measurements
Estimated aggregrate since 1970 - using consistent measurement
Founding Documents principles, Slate, (2017)
Opportunity Cost Per Year Using Impairment of Growth
Research triangulation TRAILS GDP growth rates drag (10) https://www.macrotrends.net, BEA)
GDP growth rate 1960 to 1969
4.65%
GDP growth rate 1970 to 2020
2.61%
Real GDP in 1969
$4.94 Trillion
Opportunitity costs per year
Source:
See sources
in the
below
Note.
Sources:
Dawson
and text
Seater
(2013), Slate (2017), Williams (2021)

Impact
$38 Trillion
$150 Thousand
$421 Trillion
$571 Trillion
$31 Trillion

$ 37 Trillion

A second analysis calculated the impact of not adhering to economic liberty as
documented in the Founding Documents costs at $31 trillion per year (Slate, 2017). Slate (2017)
performed a triangulation calculation using GDP growth rates, which slowed due to exponential
growth in TRAILS starting in the 1960s. The results supported Dawsom and Seater (2013). The
calculation was performed using the government’s Beige Book statistics, which changed the
GDP calculation methodology upward in 1990. Had GDP been calculated consistently, the
growth rate from 1990 to 2020 would have gone from 2.47% to zero, implying a cumulative
adverse unseen differential of $571 trillion (Williams, 2021).
Some research shows that the U.S. has already become a regulatory state. Gilens and
Page (2014) performed a multivariate analysis over two decades of 1,779 key TRAILS. Their
research showed that the U.S. is dominated by powerful business elites that can kill virtually any
proposed TRAILS and get 50% of TRAILS they want to be enacted. Others have little to no
influence on TRAILS, and even when they try to organize to influence policy, they are generally
ineffective. The economic elites, oligarchs, inherited wealth, economic-minded think tanks, and
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major investors know the political policy game, and the majority of others with policies worthy
of respect do not share the same access or influence (de La Boetie, 1553; de Tocqueville, 1835;
Gilens & Page, 2014). In today’s day and age, the most to least powerful to enact permanent
TRAILS are judges, regulatory bodies, government unions, oligarchs, financial elites, Wall
Street, lobbyists, UN, NGOs, Uniparty, and politicians (Gilen & Page, 2014; Sowell, 2012, 2016,
2019). Those with little to no power are Main Street, small and mid-sized enterprises and their
stakeholders, and individuals in the upper and middle class. Special interest groups are used to
benefit the first group using the veneer of the greater good (Mises, 1981). In contrast, in the
1960s, the ranking (from most to least) would have been politicians, Main Street, Wall Street,
and Uniparty (Sowell, 2012, 2016 & 2019).
Paul (2011) reviewed 50 essential TRAILS that may have turned America into a
regulatory state with references to the policy, studies, and economic effects. Bandow (2019) tied
significant TRAILS to Congressional Budget Office numbers and determined that the U.S. is a
regulatory state and is bankrupt (2018). Dawson and Seater (2013) performed a statistical
analysis of TRAILS and economic output and found a straightforward adverse relationship in all
macroeconomic measurements. McLaughlin (2013a, 2013b) reviewed 11 quantitative studies
and analyzed 57 years of regulation to determine that TRAILS have slowed the economy on a
compounded basis and have led to offshoring of business activity.
Goldberg (2008) tracked the start of the individualism impairing TRAILS to the 19131921 Woodrow Wilson administration. Wilson inverted the Constitution (meaning Founding
Documents - The Declaration of Independence, Bill of Rights, Constitution and Federalist
Papers) to interpret The Republic as a democracy. Wilson did so by mixing Hegelian and
Darwinian theories to create a living constitution (Goldberg, 2008; Wilson, 1885, 1913). In a

20

democracy, the individual and business serve the government (Goldberg, 2008; Quigley, 1966,
1981; Shlaes, 2009; Wilson, 1885, 1913), which is the opposite intention of the Founding
Documents (Yoo, 2020). Wilson accomplished this inversion through questionable legislative
gamesmanship aided by his donors for the creation of the permanent, unelected administrative
class to rule over business and individuals, aka the dual state construct of governance (Blum,
1956; Fraenkel, 1941; Goldberg, 2008; Griffin, 2002; Quigley, 1966, 1981; Shlaes, 2009;
Throntveit, 2017; Wilson, 1913).
The result is that every administration grew this notion of regulatory control into a
leviathan, labyrinth, and a goliath of bureaucratic economic destruction (Griffin, 2002; Higgs,
1993; Shlaes, 2009, 2013; Strassel, 2019; Stoller, 2019). The administrative class is a separate
TRAILS vector from elected officials (i.e., political class or normative class) due to a Supreme
Court Decision that gave the administrative class primacy over the political class in many
TRAILS matters. The administrative class includes over 1,000 departments including the Federal
Reserve, Department of Labor, the IRS, and generally all business oversight and intel agencies
(Crews, 2019; Dentchev et al., 2017). These departments issue over 25 times the number of
TRAILS that the political class does (Strassel, 2019; Stoller, 2019).
Other researchers contend that the observed dissipating business and economic trends
over the last 60 years are due to the nature of individualism having a focus on capital rather than
individuals and the solution is more TRAILS to curb that trend (Alvarado et al., 2018; Boushey
et al., 2017; Piketty, 2014; Soros, 2008). Individualists contend that individuals set the price of
capital by pricing in the invisible hand of the market. Thus, the consumer has primacy, not
capital nor owners of capital (Read, 2018; Sowell, 2015, 2016). Said differently, capital (assets)
only has value if individuals are willing to pay the capital value charge. Capital does not set the
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price for capital, individuals and markets do. Instead, in collectivism, central planners set the
price for capital, using cost-plus pricing rather than markets and mathematical models for
quantity and insert TRAILS to adjust the value of capital to steer society to equal individual
outcomes (Delsol et al., 2017). The models may or may not reflect the real world, and
individualists would argue that the model would not incorporate Smith's (1932) invisible hand.
For collectivists, unequal outcomes are the correlation that proves the causation of
injustice. Thus, government regulation must be employed to correct unequal outcomes (Alvardo
et al., 2018; Keynes, 1926, 1935; Piketty, 2014; Soros, 2008; van Hees, 1997; Wolff, 2016). One
explanation for gaps in outcomes is the collectivist tool of ‘sounds plausible is a truth.’ Still,
there may be many reasons why individual outcomes differ. Attempts to enforce TRAILS to
make outcomes equitable can result in the degradation of people into the lowest common
economic denominator (Hazelitt, 1959, 1988). In the business environment, this unintended
consequence often occurs when governments try to create equality despite different businesses
and across industries with different cycles (Schumpeter, 1934, 1939; Taleb, 2016).
The Impact of TRAILS on Business Performance
The ABBO model (Edmondson, 1999) is the framing for this call for research. The
framework considers both individualism and collectivism as antecedents, a form of governance
for a nation. Then, beliefs are understandings of TRAILS at the firm structure or operating level.
Beliefs are followed by behaviors driven by TRAILS-induced incentives at the firm level, also
referred to as team behaviors, and at the individual level. The individual interprets, evaluates,
and internalizes TRAILS, motivating intentional behavior that affects business performance. The
change from that calculus manifests results in outcomes (performance measures). At the A
(Antecedents-Philosophy), B (Beliefs-TRAILS), and C (Behaviors-Incentives) levels, there are
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philosophically two dichotomous research positions that are rooted in either individualism or
collectivism. Often not explicit in existing research is the function incentives have on behaviors
and, thus, outcomes, although it is omnipresent in some form, especially for individualists (De
Bottom, 2016; Hayek, 1945, 1948; Weber, 1922, 1930).
The ABBO model is not static. There is dynamism in business that occurs over time
based on new TRAILS. Antecedents or the philosophy of government can change with a new
administration and or personnel. For individualism, improved performance outcomes are for the
business entity and individuals. For collectivism, enhanced performance is represented by more
equal outcomes for individuals, and improvement of outcomes for individuals or specific
businesses is secondary (Hayek, 1943, 1988; Marx & Engels, 1848; Roth, 2010; Schumpeter,
1909, 1934, 1939, 1942; Weber, 1922, 1930). Firms are continually evaluating TRAILS,
changing and refining their beliefs and behaviors based on observed outcomes. Exogenous and
endogenous factors are put into the calculus of prior antecedents, if applicable, and beliefs
(intrinsic and extrinsic) are adjusted before determining adjustments to behaviors (incentives) to
improve business outcomes.
TRAILS occur at three compounding and interconnected levels: (1) Constitutional level
(Bastiat, 2007; Gyford, 1987), (2) Business formation level (Dent, 2014; Hoggett, 2006), and (3)
Operating level (Bainbridge, 2002, 2015, 2019; Cioffi, 2004; Hayek, 1945, 1955, 1960; Paul,
2008, 2011, 2012; Rand & Peikoff, 1984, 1993, 1999; Rand et al., 1986). Figure 3 showcases a
framework for the impact of TRAILS on business performance.
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Figure 3
Framework on Impact of TRAILS on Business Performance

Constitutional Choice: The antecedent choices in the ABBO model are individualism or
collectivism. The philosophical choice will determine economic development and living
standards (Hayek, 1943, 1960; Read, 2018; Schumpeter, 1942; Sowell, 2016). Individualists
believe equality of outcome before freedom of individual results in neither and freedom of
individual before equality gets both (Friedman, 1962, 1972). Individualism occurs when a nation
has few regulations impairing entrepreneurial innovation and growth by creative destruction.
Collectivists believe equality of outcomes is fairer and provides more freedom. In
collectivist philosophy, fairness in equity equals freedom. Therefore, freedom is an equal
outcome, and government-imposed regulations should be employed to achieve comparable
outcomes, regardless of abilities, efforts, or utility. Gaps in outcomes are explained primarily by
unfairness. The theory is analogous to Alice's Dodo philosophy in Wonderland, "Everybody has
won, and everybody must have prizes" (Carroll, 1865, p. 15).
Firm-Level Choice: The firm's choice is either shareholder primacy (associated with
individualism) or stakeholder primacy (associated with collectivism). For shareholder primacy,
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Friedman (1962) states the purpose of the firm "is to maximize shareholder value that is fulfilling
the firm's purpose because the firm can pay employees, pay taxes, and support charities.
Deviating from this is stealing from the shareholder who the laws are to protect" (p. 53). Denis
(2016) builds on Friedman’s statement by promoting corporate social responsibility (CSR) or
environmental social and corporate governance (ESG) matters by noting the importance of a
firm's freedom to be responsive to the communities relevant to the firm. Recent economic studies
determined that ESG only made money for third-party advisors, was propaganda for big
companies, harmed smaller companies due to reporting costs, and had little ESG impact (Cornell
& Damodaran, 2020).
Research shows that governments that believe in stakeholder primacy will use TRAILS
to have management power over private industry under the pretense of protecting all
constituents, even those in faraway lands (Scherer & Palazzo, 2009; Soros, 2008; Wolff, 2016).
Using the business form by stakeholder primacy can be another way for collectivist governments
to attempt to steer society for the good of all (not just the individual), to achieve equal outcomes,
and not necessarily maximize total outcome (Berman et al., 2016; Hayek, 1948, 1979, 1982,
1988, 1996; Lipton, 2017; Marz, 1991; Piketty, 2014; Schumpeter, 1942; Sowell, 1993, 2001,
2007, 2011, 2012 & 2015). Further, a key concept of some stakeholder primacy collectivists
purports to believe a company should be a sovereign of the world, not just of the company's,
shareholders, stakeholders, and the nation (Scherer & Palazzo, 2009). Stakeholder theory is
consistent with collectivist principles (Soros, 2008; Bainbridge, 2019; Doig, 2011; Donaldson &
Preston, 1995; Dodd & Merrick, 1932; Elson & Goossen, 2017; Ferrell et al., 2017; Wolff,
2016).
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Stakeholder primacy typically gains traction in the U.S. with the public and politicos after
a significant adverse event as the government purports and propagandizes to the masses to
correct matters and markets through central planning (Soros, 2008; von Mises, 2007; Wolff,
2016). However, shareholder primacy research suggests that substantial corrections are due to
government intervention in business and the markets, which leads to deferment of small
individualism market corrections until the government-created constricted markets implode
(Rothbard, 1959, 1990, 2002, 2009; Schumpeter, 1939; Sowell, 2007, 2011a, 2011b, 2015;
Taleb, 2005, 2007, 2012, 2016; Tacoma, 2020).
Operational Level: Some TRAILS directly impact industry or business operations. The
individualist line of thought would advocate for only enough TRAILS for capital formation,
competition, fair markets, innovation, and equal opportunity (Marz, 1991; Read, 2018; Robert &
Ross, 1993; Spooner, 1999). Collectivism advocates for a higher level of TRAILS to steer
society and innovation to strive for an equal outcome for individuals (Marx & Engels, 1848;
Roth, 2010).
The analysis of the literature suggests that TRAILS requires right-sizing. The expansion
of wrong-sized TRAILS threatens the future of economies and business environments. In the
following section, 10 propositions emerge from an analytical framework of TRAILS' role on
business performance, seeking to understand what the state of the U.S. is today and the
implications for TRAILS right-sizing.
Frameworks, Propositions, and Research Questions
This call for research seeks to examine the current TRAILS environment and its
implications for the business environment. Thus, theoretical frameworks were developed based
on a review of existing literature on TRAILS' impact on business performance and preliminary
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interviews with industry executives. Figure 4 is a theoretical model developed to determine the
appropriate role of regulations on business performance. The red line is total GDP, the green line
is small business, and big business is between them. The model starts with the thesis that an
appropriate government regulation level favors business performance, expressed in TRAILS as a
percent of GDP for illustration purposes. I define right-sized TRAILS for business performance
as the minimum set of rules that level the playing field to enable commerce. These rules are
dynamic and may need to change over time as the business environment changes. Unnecessary
TRAILS will lead to sub-optimal performance, up until the point of market failure.
Figure 4
TRAILS Right-Sizing Model

Proposition 1
There is an appropriate level and set of TRAILS (right-sized) needed to enable commerce
and that favors business performance (point r in x-axis).
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Proposition 2
TRAILS beyond level r (henceforth wrong-sized TRAILS) harm business performance.
Proposition 3
Larger, more established firms pick up lost business by small firms due to wrong-sized
TRAILS.
The U.S. is at some point on the curve in this model. It depends on how you measure and
calculate TRAILS and GDP, including methodologies such as cash basis, accrual basis, or
modified accrual, among other factors. The first set of proposed research questions stemming
from the model is in the spirit of developing, testing, and refining it.
Research Question 1: What is the most appropriate measurement methodology to
determine where the U.S. is (point v) relative to right-sized TRAILS (point r) and market
failure (point m)?
There are multiple possible measures to gauge the benefits of a country’s regulatory
environment, such as financial benefits (Elson et al., 2017), impacts on society (Carter, 2018;
Goldin, 1992, 2014), innovation (Tsanova & Havenith, 2019), economy (Hannan, 2011, 2013),
environment (Bracket, 2019), and stakeholders (Bainbridge, 1993, 2002, 2015, 2019; Bebchuk &
Tallarita, 2020; Cornell & Damodaran, 2020).
Two macro reports provide interesting insights into what could be essential measures of
TRAILS impact on business performance. The first was from the 2020 Heritage Foundation
Index and IMF, which revealed that economic freedom brings higher business performance. The
2019 Human Freedom Index (HFI), global measurement of personal, civil, and financial
freedom, with a focus on legal more than economic, complemented the Heritage Report
information, of which the focus is more economical than legal, with virtually the same
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conclusions (Vásquez & Porčnik, 2019). HFI computes human freedom based on measures that
encompass personal, civil, and economic freedom and defines freedom as the absence of
coercive TRAILS. HFI views personal, civil, economic, and individual liberties as inseparable
and paramount for human progress.
These measures are informative, but they are not directly related to TRAILS' impact on
business performance. More research is necessary to identify the key measures that will correctly
position countries in the continuum between right-sized TRAILS (point r) and the level of
TRAILS that lead to market failure (point m).
Research Question 2: How can the impact of TRAILS on business performance be
empirically derived, tested, and refined?
Once TRAILS measures have been developed, research is needed to derive and refine the
relationship between TRAILS and business performance for both large and small businesses.
Concerning the model, research is required to establish the functional relationship between
TRAILS and business performance, broken down for large businesses and SMEs.
Proposition 4
TRAILS have a disproportionate impact on SMEs.
Beyond a certain level, TRAILS appear to harm small businesses disproportionately more than
big companies. This observation is based on specific TRAILS analysis of Sarbanes-Oxley
(Bartlett, 2009; Carter, 2013; Cohen & Zarowin, 2010), Affordable Care Act (Silver & Hyman,
2018), Dodd-Frank Act (Allison, 2012 & 2014), and research such as Stigler’s (1964, 1971,
1983) Nobel Prize-winning work on how TRAILS create oligarchies. The number of public
companies has been more than halved since 2000 due to an increase in TRAILS, which suggests
a call for more research into this area.
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This theoretical proposition is not far-fetched when considering other signals in the U.S.
business environment. Mitchell (2014), Fried (2009), and Lavecchia and Mitchell (2016) indicate
that wrong-sized TRAILS are bankrupting SMEs and damaging cities of those bankrupt
companies. This is based on the anti-competitive practices of companies that have benefited from
TRAILS, for example, by acquiring and exerting predatory pricing power. They often use that
anti-competitive power to eliminate competition, which lowers the tax base of municipalities.
These analyses rely on the registry of new U.S. laws at the Federal, state, and local level of
approximately 200,000 new TRAILS a year, the uptake of claims made at each court level, and
economics statistics from entities such as the Institute of Local Self Reliance, the Bureau of
Labor Statistics, the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the quarterly Beige Book, financial budget
reports of government entities, and testimonies under oath at the Federal, state, and municipal
levels (Mclaughlin, 2013a, 2013b; The Economist 2013, 2016, 2017).
Research Question 3: What TRAILS impact SMEs disproportionally compared to large
businesses?
To illustrate the importance of Research Question 3, a prominent company executive, when
asked about the disproportionate impact of TRAILS on small business, used the phrase that if
you are not at the table, you are the meal. The CEO’s company grew to be one of the world's
largest in its industry due to his close relationship with every U.S. administration over the last 30
years. The company supported every scientism, technocracy solutionism for more government
control, and wealth transfer propaganda of every Presidential administration. The company was a
significant beneficiary of government TRAILS. The company strategically became best-in-class
at exploiting government agencies that accelerated wildly under many administrations (Aitken,
1996 & 2015; Berman, 1989; Bernays, 2005, 2015; Hayward, 2004; Kadlec, 2011).
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This anecdotal example is one where TRAILS may advertently disadvantage SMEs.
However, there are other cases of possibly inadvertent impact of TRAILS on SMEs. For
example, SMEs were hurt significantly more than large businesses during COVID-19, and
TRAILS introduced to push the economy forward may have left SMEs relatively worse off.
After the pandemic started, within seven months, there was a massive transfer of wealth. The top
22 billionaires increased their net worth from $7.9 trillion in April 2020 to $10.2 trillion in
September 2020 (Thubron, 2020). Amazon, Microsoft, Google, Walmart, and Facebook
accounted for the bulk of the beneficial transfer (Schwab, 2020; Thubron, 2020). A natural
experiment may be occurring in real-time as of this writing, where TRAILS transfer wealth to
big companies at the expense of SMEs. This leads to a question that will be very interesting to
examine as the pandemic's economic outcomes transpire (Deist, 2020a, 2020b, 2020c).
Research Question 4: What is the impact and implications of pandemic-induced
TRAILS on large businesses vs. SMEs?
Proposition 5
Overregulation can lead to market failure.
At some point, TRAILS reach a position of over-regulation and undermine GDP, also known as
market failure (Caldwell, 2008; Hayek, 1943, 1960; Murray, 2016; Schumpeter, 1943;
Whitehead, 2013, 2016, 2019). There are numerous wrong size TRAILS paths to market failure,
including unsound money (Salerno, 1994), regulatory overreach, lack of transparency, loss of
property rights, intervention by government, unfair markets, government role expansion,
interference with disruptive innovation, unequal opportunities, lack of individual justice (the
largest minority), and interference with shareholder primacy (Dunford, 2020). Overregulation or
wrong regulations in any one of these areas could contribute to systemic market failure.
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Research Question 5: How close is the U.S. business environment to market failure
(point m)?
Proposition 6
Non-enforcement of appropriate TRAILS is detrimental to business performance.
The framework in this call for research proposes a point (r in Figure 4) in the state of TRAILS
that is optimal for business performance for both large firms and SMEs. Proposition 1 states that
there is a minimum of TRAILS and rules of the game needed to ensure fair competition, which
implies there are points to the left of r that leave room for TRAILS to be enacted and enforced.
An essential way in which government influences business performance is by inaction, not
creating or enforcing right-sized TRAILS. While not as evident as direct investment and
proactive legislation, government inaction can be every bit as destructive to our constitutional
republic as TRAILS that hurt business performance (Rand et al., 1984).
For example, this inaction is seen in the government not enforcing anti-competitive
regulations and enabling Amazon to become a monopoly in several categories by acquisition
(LaVecchia & Mitchell, 2016). This lack of enforcement is evidenced by over 500 FAANG
(Facebook, Amazon, Apple, Netflix, Google) acquisitions with no antitrust impediments and
thousands of filed antitrust complaints with no review or quick review (The Economist, 2017).
This lack of enforcement of TRAILS should be explored at the industry level. For example, one
could argue that the lack of enforcement of intellectual property protection in media and
entertainment is detrimental to business performance for both large businesses and SMEs.
Figure 5 helps illustrate the problem of both action and inaction by the government that
impacts business performance. Figure 5 offers critical and abstract thought and appreciation for
the dynamic and complex phenomena of regulatory action and inaction. The matrix figure shows
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two ways the government helps businesses (i.e., green boxes) and how they harm businesses
(i.e., red boxes). On the Y-axis of the diagram is the appropriate regulation level in place, yes or
no. On the X-axis is the government creating and enforcing (action) or not (inaction). A base
assumption is that the government is the only entity that can enforce TRAILS legally.
Figure 5
Regulatory Action and Inaction and the Impact on Business Performance

TRAILS can harm businesses if there is inappropriate regulation. The government can
also harm businesses by not enforcing appropriate regulations or unequal enforcement of
applicable laws (Edwards, 2014; LaVecchia & Mitchell, 2016; Strassel, 2019). The universe of
possible positive (negative) TRAILS outcomes depends upon the appropriate TRAILS along
these dimensions of a favorable business environment:
•

Competitive (anti-competitive) markets (LaVecchia & Mitchell, 2016; The
Economist, 2017; Shepsle, 1982),

•

Commerce to succeed (fail) (Rand & Peikoff, 1984, 1993; Wilson, 1989),
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•

Equal (unequal) opportunity (Hargadon & Kenney, 2012), and

•

High (Low) trust between government and commerce, leading to optimal (suboptimal) business performance (Boaz, 2015; Boettke, 1997; Hayek, 1943,1945,
1955, 1960; Marz, 1991; Roth, 2010).

Research Question 6: What is the minimum set of TRAILS that can favor business
performance?
Proposition 7
TRAILS that foster innovation will favor business performance.
Wrong-sized TRAILS can flatten, straighten, or retard the innovation growth curve (Marz, 1991;
Schumpeter, 1939; The Economist, 2017; Tsanova & Havenith, 2019; van dev Berg, 2011).
Entrepreneurial innovation is the economic engine of successful economies, based on a business
cycle of continuous innovation and creative destruction (Aghion et al., 2016; Birkinshaw et al.,
2016; Blokland & Van Weesep, 2006; King & Levine, 1993; Mintzberg, 1990; Schumpeter,
1939; Zenter, 2010). Flattening or flat lining the innovation curve can cause economies to
become stagnant, constricted, or collapsed (Aghion et al., 2016; Aghion et al., 2018; Aghion et
al., 2019; Chesbrough, 2003; Christensen et al., 2015; Ebeling, 1993; Sweezy, 1943; Shepsle,
1982; Swedberg, 1991; Taleb, 2007, 2012; Tavierne, 2018).
Disruptive innovation emerges from the optionality of making asymmetrical, usually
decentralized, investments that allow individual firms to ideate through trial and error, risk and
reward of creativity, search for new innovative spaces, virtuous cycles of knowledge,
entrepreneurial activity, and consequent wealth creation (Aghion et al., 2016; Aghion et al.,
2018; Aghion et al., 2019; Freedman, 1957; Hayek, 1948, 1982; Marz, 1991; Schumpeter, 1939
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& 1943; Taleb, 2012; von Mises, 2006, 2007; Weber, 1922, 1930). A key policy question is the
appropriate TRAILS that foster innovation in general and disruptive innovation in particular.
Research Question 7: What is the appropriate role for TRAILS in entrepreneurial
innovation?
Propositions 5-7 suggest that over-regulation and under-regulation are sub-optimal for business
performance and that there should be appropriate TRAILS that promote innovation. This search
for a balance in TRAILS should lead to a proper TRAILS set for business performance. Research
is needed to determine the optimal TRAILS level for business performance that provides equal
opportunity for large businesses and SMEs. Ultimately, answering these questions will help
direct policy-making and lobbying efforts by firms. One feature of the ABBO model suggests
that there should be set beliefs that guide how TRAILS should be enacted to favor business
performance. This set of beliefs are reflected in the U.S. Constitution. Therefore, the Founding
Documents of Liberty and Individualism are the antecedent foundation and framing supporting
and holding the blocks in place to right-size TRAILS (Figure 6).
The framers of the Constitution were scholars who had real-world business experience,
so their wisdom is in the Founding Documents. The following list summarizes eight beliefs for
individuals to create knowledge (Stigler, 1961) and thus wealth (Gilder, 2013 & 2018).
(1) Transparency, mentioned 13 times in the Constitution (Skidmore & Fitts, 2019;
Solari, 2019).
(2) Government’s role provides for the protection of security and inalienable individual’s
rights (Bork & Hayek, 1978; Hamilton & Madison, 2018).
(3) Justice (of the smallest minority, the individual) or ‘the first duty of society’
(Hamilton & Madison, 2018; Jefferson & Yarbrough, 1963).

35

(4) Private property, the cornerstone of liberty (Hamilton & Madison, 2018; Hinkle,
2014; Jefferson, & Yarbrough, 1963; Sandefur & Sandefur, 2016).
(5) Disruptive innovation (Aghion et al., 2018; Aghion et al., 2019; Hamilton & Madison,
2018; Hayek, 1948, 1982; Jefferson & Yarbrough, 1963; Marz, 1991; Schumpeter, 1939).
(6) Competitive free markets (Boaz, 2015; Bork & Hayek, 1978; Hamilton & Madison,
2018; Hazlitt, 1959, 1988; Jefferson & Yarbrough, 1963).
(7) Equal opportunity (Boaz, 2015; Hamilton & Madison, 2018; Jefferson, & Yarbrough,
1963; Palmer 2011, 2013, 2014).
(8) Business form (Bork & Hayek, 1978; Ebeling, 1993; Friedman, 1962, 1970; Hamilton
& Madison, 2018; Jefferson, & Yarbrough, 1963; Mocsary, 2017).
Business form, constitutionally, is contractual and natural law between persons and
entities. Governments adjudicate contractual disputes between private parties and negotiate
foreign trade tariffs to pay for government cost (Hamilton & Madison, 2018; Jefferson, &
Yarbrough, 1963). This business form-built American business values into what is known as a
trust society (Boaz, 2015), and the unique structure made for efficient markets and cohesive and
values-driven society (Weber, 1930).
Based on these eight guidelines, the Constitution and the Contemporary TRAILS
Paradigm aims to create a business environment of optimal system coherence for the individual
to promote equal opportunity (Figure 6). When aggregated, the closer to fulfilling everyone’s
aim, the closer the business system is to its core cultural imperative. The core cultural imperative
is a risk-adjusted, antifragile, maximized pursuit of happiness of the individual that optimizes the
business system. Whenever observed in an individual’s sphere of influence, another individual
struggle, and the individual has the power to help. The individual should do so. However, no
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intervening individual or party has the right to coerce the individual to do so. Helping provides
knowledge that creates more wisdom, which invigorates as do many other actions, the business
environment, and the virtuous optimization of system coherence. Regardless, the choice to act is
solely the individual’s decision.
Figure 6
Constitution-based and Contemporary TRAILS Paradigm for TRAILS
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Research Questions 8: What are the appropriate measures and assumptions to right-size
TRAILS and to monitor and assess TRAILS right-sizing?
TRAILS' right-sizing starts with philosophical dilemmas in the first two boxes of the ABBO
model (Antecedents/Philosophy to Beliefs/TRAILS). The last two boxes encompass a social
phenomenon (i.e., incentives and behaviors respond to the philosophy and beliefs in the first two
boxes, resulting in business performance outcomes). Outcomes, which ultimately are knowledge
creation, loopback and are compared for suitableness for propriety with the antecedents, beliefs,
and behaviors and modifying, changing, or adapting human action (Hayek, 1945, 1955;
Schumpeter, 1909, 1939; von Mises, 1940, 1957, 1990, 2005, 2006, 2015).
To understand incentives and behaviors and how they lead to business outcomes, getting
input from business executives is necessary. In essence, as victims and beneficiaries of the
incentives, behaviors, and outcomes that follow from TRAILS, business executives' perspectives
are essential. Further, executives can also provide substance to the concept formulation of the
first two boxes: philosophy and beliefs (Rand, 1990). Business practitioners are not often
TRAILS advisors. They are seldom consulted for TRAILS development and primarily ignored
when included (Chambers et al., 2019) unless they are lobbyists financed by special interests
(Gilens & Page, 2014).
Fully understanding TRAILS' impact requires the input of those impacted by the
phenomena, which can see both the big and small picture. Business executives can provide
completeness to knowledge creation for TRAILS right-sizing. The approach of executive
involvement is consistent with the Greek definition of a philosopher: warrior with wisdom of the
mind (Salzgeber & Salzgeber, 2019). A philosopher examines their philosophies in the real
world to refine them. Moreover, the approach addresses, in part, Hayek’s knowledge problem for
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TRAILS by obtaining deterministic and some indeterministic data from those individuals who
are knowledgeable of the effects of TRAILS (Bainbridge, 1993, 2019; Broome et al., 2011;
Hayek, 1945, 1955, 1996, 2013; Kiesling, 2015).
Research Question 9: What are the real-world perspectives, insights, clarity, and
understanding of business executives that can assist in TRAILS right- sizing?
Proposition 8
All businesses in the same industry should be subject to the same TRAILS applied
consistently.
The issue of disparity in business performance for large businesses vs. SMEs has been
discussed already. But size is just one dimension of heterogeneity that must be considered when
developing and enacting right-sized TRAILS. Another critical measurement is the distinction
between private and public companies. With no systemic competitive advantage, private
companies out-perform public companies by 6% to 8% per year, implying an annual loss of
wealth creation of $1.9 trillion for American business, and research shows private equity has the
advantage because they have fewer TRAILS to adhere to compared to public companies
(Acharya et al., 2018; Alles, 2007; Bargeron et al., 2008; Bartlett, 2009; Barton et al., 2015;
Barton et al., 2017; Barton et al., 2019; Bernstein et al., 2018; Bradshaw & Sloan, 2002;
Cochrane, 2004; Leslie & Oyer, 2008; Ljungquvist & Richardson, 2003; Meddaugh, 2017;
Mocsary, 2017; Terry et al., 2018; The Economist, 2016).
Research Question 10: What mechanisms can be incorporated into TRAILS processes to
ensure that they are implemented equally for all types of businesses, including large vs.
SMEs and private vs. public companies?
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Proposition 9
The government’s intentional stance that leads to over-regulation has implications on
how to right-size TRAILS.
Bork and Hayek (1978) theorized that the shift to the regulatory state due to TRAILS
would be unplanned as people in government gradually introduced TRAILS until over-regulation
was reached. Some argue that individuals in government and their corporatist and globalist codependents simply care about abnormal rent-seeking and are therefore less concerned about the
Founding Documents, liberty, and natural law economics (Buchanan, 1969, 1975, 1992;
Buchannan & Musgrave, 1999; Buchanan & Tullock, 1962; Buchanan & Wagner, 1977;
Schweizer, 2013, 2019; Whitehead, 2013, 2019).
Some historical developments suggest that excessive regulations are at least partially
planned. President Wilson planned the creation of a regulatory state and created the
administrative class of government in addition to the political class (Blum, 1956; Fraenkel, 1941;
Horowitz, 1997, 2013, 2013). Wilson also planned for but did not live long enough to create the
United Nations system (Pestritto, 2005). Shivakumar (2007) stated that the U.N. plans and
coordinates TRAILS often with corporatists, administrative, and political classes to the detriment
of individualism. By the nature of the U.N., TRAILS across countries tend to be collectivist as
they seek equality of outcomes for business performance and individuals, despite the different
national regulatory, economic, business environments, cultures, skill sets, priorities, and values
(De Weaver, 2020; Koire, 2011; Postman, 2011; Wood, 2016, 2018). For example, the U.N. is
seeking a global one-world government with a proposal known as ‘the great reset’ to be run by
collectivists, bureaucrats, and technocrats (Charlton, 2018; Schwab, 2016; Schwab & Malleret,
2020).
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If there is underlying orchestration to seek similar conditions for business performance,
or whether they are the product of conversations and negotiations between independent country
representatives, that will lead to different avenues towards TRAILS right-sizing. If cross-country
regulations have orchestration and planning, new controls should be embedded into U.N.
processes to avoid these kinds of influences. Suppose these projects are the product of
independents representatives coming together. In that case, the research proposed in this paper
can help inform agreements made to ensure that the appropriate TRAILS are enacted for U.S.
business performance (DiLorenzo, 2015, 2020).
Research Question 11: What are the implications for TRAILS right-sizing depending on
whether wrong-sized TRAILS are unplanned or planned?
Conclusions
The broad agenda in this call for research is to understand the impact of TRAILS on
business performance and to create knowledge that allows for TRAILS right-sizing for a healthy
business environment. First, a model was developed to capture the complexity of this
phenomenon (i.e., the ABBO model) from the macro-level philosophies (rooted in individualism
and collectivism) and beliefs that influence a regulatory environment and the consequent
incentives, behaviors, and outcomes for business performance that tend to follow. The structure
of the philosophy of government or antecedent, followed by the resultant TRAILS beliefs at the
individual, firm, or operational level, incentivizes the behaviors. Business executives bring the
dynamic to the business environment as they interpret, evaluate, and internalize TRAILS, which
become incentives that motivate intentional behavior, leading to business outcomes.
The call for research identified 11 research questions that ring-fence the contemporary
TRAILS phenomena. Any business executive concerned for the business's regulatory
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environment's future would want them answered. This research represents a call to examine the
impact of TRAILS on business performance, the impact of TRAILS on different types of
businesses (e.g., large vs. SMEs, public vs. private), the proper role for the government to rightsize TRAILS, a grounding on evidence to right-size TRAILS, how government should consider
all intended and unintended consequences of TRAILS actions and inactions, TRAILS’ impact on
entrepreneurial innovation, and whether the U.S. has reached or not a state of over-regulation
and the extent to which getting to this state has been or is being planned.
I propose to answer these questions based on the individual rights reflected in the eight
cornerstones for business from the U.S. Constitution. But whether regulators and business
executives believe they are the right ones or not, they are constraints for TRAILS right-sizing
that cannot be ignored because they are sealed in the Constitution. The Constitution calls for a
TRAILS system that aims to create a business environment of optimal system coherence for the
individual to promote equal opportunity to develop their talent to maximize their pursuit of
happiness. The core cultural imperative is the risk-adjusted, antifragile, maximized pursuit of
happiness of the individual that optimizes the business system.
The literature review suggests that the U.S. may have reached a stage of over-regulation
that hurts business performance. This concern influences the resulting propositions and research
questions. Whether the state is one of over-regulation or not, any business executive and
policymaker should be interested in the findings from research to answer the questions proposed.
The paradigm presented is not about whether the government should play a role in regulating a
business environment, but to what extent it should perform that role and what are the analytical
methods that will enable regulators to right-size TRAILS based on evidence-based rationale.
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I propose research that examines all TRAILS outcomes based on fair competition and
incentives for innovation. TRAILS right-sizing should seek a healthy business environment that
creates fair and free markets for all competitors and a government that works for the people and
makes a level-playing field for businesses across industries. I optimistically trust human nature is
such that most business executives will want this kind of regulatory environment for fairness.
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CHAPTER 4: THE ROLE OF THE BUSINESS EXECUTIVE ON RIGHT-SIZING OF
REGULATIONS FOR BUSINESS PERFORMANCE
Introduction
This study proposes a broad agenda to empirically understand the impact of TRAILS on
business performance and create knowledge that allows regulation right-sizing for the
revivification of the business environment, utilizing a qualitative study with interviews to the
business executives. The government plays a role in creating TRAILS (all government friction
costs, such as Taxes, Regulations, Assessments, Insurance, Legal, Subsidies). Right-sized
TRAILS are defined as those that create a healthy environment for business performance.
Wrong-sized TRAILS make the business environment less healthy.
Wrong-sized regulations can result in government regulatory capture by influential large
businesses due to disproportional costs on small and medium-sized enterprises (SME), which
often go out of business or are acquired due to the excessive regulatory burden (Stigler, 1964,
1971 & 1983). There are reasons to be concerned about the possible overregulation of business
in the U.S. Per the Chairman of Blackstone Group LP: "Overregulation is the worst thing that
has happened to America…it has taken the entrepreneurial zeal out…of corporate managers.”
(Bartlett, 2009). According to McKinsey & Co, who surveyed 2,186 executives representing a
range of industries and company sizes (Musters et al., 2013; Rand, 1965), TRAILS is the secondhighest priority for CEOs, after customers. TRAILS cost executives’ companies 30% to 50% of
the bottom line. According to the survey executives expect another 10% wrong-sized TRAILS
impairment every five years (Bughin et al., 2011), impairing the economy's growth engine by
creative constriction in innovation (Meddaugh, 2014).
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Three Noble Prized theories are puzzled along with heavy-weight microeconomists to
crystalize the contemporary phenomena. Stigler (1964, 1971 & 1983) won a Nobel Prize for his
objective theory that wrong-sized regulations cause oligarchical intertwinements known as
regulatory capture. Because the U.S. and individualism are the greatest economic and civil
wealth generators of all other constructs combined, Hayek warned it would be a slow collectivist
take over, taking decades. It would be barely noticeable until too late.
Buchannan won a Nobel Prize for his theory that most government individuals have no
interest in a healthy business environment. Their unaccountable power turns them into petty rentseeking tyrants (Buchannan & Tullock, 1962, Buchannan, 1969 & 1975 Buchannan & Wagner,
1977; Schweizer, 2013). Their sole interest is conspiring with other government individuals to
use TRAILS for extortion and coercion to earn abnormal rents above a limited marketable skill
stack in as many business areas as possible. If this theory is correct, it would be a primary reason
for ever-expanding wrong-sized TRAILS into every area of business for which government has
no legitimate reason nor competence (Boettke & Palagashvili, 2013; Rand, 1990). The actions of
the individuals in government are consistent with methodological individualism (Buchanan &
Musgrave, 1999, Buchannan & Tullock, 1962; Becker, 1976 & 1983, Schumpeter, 1909;
Webber, 1922; Spooner, 1999; Hayek, 1948; Elster, 1982; Infantino, 2014; MacDonald, 2018).
Buchannan's Nobel Prize work is called Public Choice Theory (PCT).
Figure 7 indicates that the Nobel Prize Laurates may have been prescient, as the U. S.
share of per capita GDP has decreased by 45% since 1960. 85% of all inventions are due to
knowledge creation and only 15% due to capital and labor (Eesley & Miller, 2017), and
American individualism has created the most innovation over the last 200 years. The U.S. is best
at diffusing innovation, also (Bailey & Tupy, 2020). There seems to be a correlation between the
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increase in TRAILS and the flatlining and decrease of U. S. GDP. International GDP is down by
25% since 2000, due to less innovation to diffuse (Macrotrends, 2021; Bailey & Tupy, 2020).
Figure 7
2000 Years of Economic History in One Chart

Senior executives bring real-world oversight and longitudinal experience to the
investigation on whether regulations are right-sized or not. They have an extensive field of vision
and can substantially ground the phenomena on their expertise. This research perspicuously
provides a voice to business executives who contribute to civil and economic elevations and yet
curiously have had minor input in the literature on the impact of TRAILS on business
performance, as well as little influence on TRAILS other than as lobbyists (Gilens & Page, 2014;
Becker, 1976 & 1983), compared to virtually all other stakeholders (Shlaes, 2009 & 2013; Rand
& Peikoff, 1999). Elite executive interviews were performed to accomplish this objective. The
research utilizes grounded theory with data from the elite executive interviews, literature, source
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data, and diagrams based on real-world experience and logic and reason at the consequential
level (Hayek, 1948; Hochschild, 2009; Charmaz, 2006 & 2014). The research question is:
How can TRAILS be right-sized to create a healthy business environment?
There is a scarcity of research that captures the real-world input from business executives. This
scarcity is likely due to macroeconomics' misuse as prescriptive. Further, access to executives'
trust is rare. Finally, most researchers are not on a peer level with executives. Thus, robust
analysis is not possible. Nevertheless, understanding the impact of TRAILS on incentives and
behaviors and how they lead to business outcomes by getting input from business executives is
essential. In essence, as victims and beneficiaries of the incentives, behaviors, and outcomes that
follow from TRAILS, business executives' perspective is critical. Further, executives can also
provide substance to the concept formulation of TRAILS philosophy and beliefs. In particular,
understanding their perspective and the incentives under which they operate can help understand
the impact of TRAILS on business performance.
Purpose of the Paper
The paper's panoptic purpose is to build theory on the impact of regulations on business
performance based on interviews with elite executives and qualitative methods to develop an
enhanced view of right-sized TRAILS for a healthy business environment. A key objective is to
gain knowledge of the real world and consequential perspectives from heretofore largely ignored
yet knowledgeable individuals in the business ecosystem to inform TRAILS right-sizing for
business performance.
The paper aims to leverage grounded theory from these elite interviews to develop new
theoretical frameworks. It captures vast interdisciplinary literature, sources, and data to produce
abstract thought and theory advancement, starting with an appreciation for the dynamic and
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complex individual, behavioral, extrinsic, and intrinsic actions of businesses in response to
exogenous TRAILS. Lastly, the paper aims to reduce some of the extreme epistemic polarity of
the TRAILS phenomena by bringing reason, reality, and logic to the contradictions. The paper
will assist all sincerely concerned stakeholders in a constructive real-world beacon to the social
phenomena to right-size TRAILS.
Foundational Theory on the Business Impact of TRAILS
Theoretical Framework
A theoretical structure of ‘Antecedents to Beliefs to Behaviors to Outcomes’ (ABBO
model) is the framing for this research (Edmondson, 1999) and can be seen in Figure 8.
Figure 8
Theoretical, Qualitative Structure for the TRAILS Ecosystem

The adapted model considers the philosophy of individualism and collectivism as
antecedents. The antecedent is the parameters in which commerce is conducted. Individuals in
the antecedent government understand beliefs by creating appropriate TRAILS to manifest the
selected philosophy at the firm structure, operating level, or individual level. Beliefs are followed
by individual behaviors, driven by TRAILS-induced incentives by individuals at the firm level,
also referred to as team behaviors (Edmondson, 1999), and at the individual level. The
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individuals in business interpret, evaluate, and internalize TRAILS, motivating intentional
behaviors that affect business performance. The dynamic change from that calculus manifests
results in outcomes (performance measures). Understanding micro problems and solutions by
logical extension accumulate to understand macro-activity aggregates (Webber, 1922).
For individualism, improved outcomes of performance measures are for the business
entity and individuals based on increased performance and incentives. For collectivism,
enhanced performance measures are measured by equal outcomes for individuals, and
improvement of outcomes of performance measures is secondary (Marcuse, 1958, 1961, 1966,
2013; Marx & Engels, 1848; Roth, 2010; Schumpeter, 1942; Weber, 1922, 1930). Often not
explicit in existing research is the function incentives have on behaviors and, thus, outcomes,
although it is omnipresent in some form (Weber, 1922, 1930).
Consequential Knowledge and Mistake Management
Executives have superior industry knowledge and decentralize asymmetrical knowledge
and make real adjustments to the new knowledge in real-time, which begets more knowledge.
This market adjustment mechanism is known as mistake management of individualism, also
known as consequential knowledge. Further, the executive is impacted by incentives and
disincentives to competition and entrepreneurial innovation to maximize utility. Unfortunately,
the government lacks this motivation and accountability, so it is essential and primary to
understand the perspective of executives on the impact of TRAILS on business performance.
The Pretense of Knowledge and Knowledge Problem
Private industry information is far from perfect because the essential knowledge resides
with the future market. The concept comes from Hayek’s (1945) knowledge problem of the
market’s unknowable unknowns. First, to assume such knowledge is acquirable in advance
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violates scientific rules of temporal and bivalence (Hayek, 1945). Hayek (1988) stated that to
imagine one can do so is nonsensical. Second, while knowledge is incomplete, the private
industry has superior industry knowledge. Third, and most importantly, asymmetrical knowledge
is achieved by decentralized learning and distributed market experimentation (asymmetrical
antifragile bets). Those progressions lead to more information to enhance existing knowledge for
the business individual (Gilder, 2013, 2018; Taleb, 2012, 2014). The government lacks
distributed industry and market knowledge and uses statistical aggregates, which are descriptive,
not prescriptive (Hayek, 1948, 1985). Therefore, regulators and politicos have at least three high
obstacles, which decrease their ability, along with lack of accountability, for credible TRAILS
policy.
Knowledge Creates Wealth
Knowledge creation must be anchored in reality (Gilder, 2013, 2018; Sowell, 1993, 2001,
2007, 2012, 2019). If not, the result is adverse seen and unseen consequences of knowledge
impairment. Specifically, opportunity cost is caused by the disruptive consequences of wrongsized TRAILS on knowledge acquisition. This impairment is due to the disruption of the
market's invisible hand and entrepreneurial innovation (Bastiat, 2007; Schumpeter, 1939; Smith,
1932). The only subjective matter is quantifying the precise amount of the unseen opportunity
cost that becomes apparent over time. But it can be approximated by examining real growth
impairment (Bastiat, 2007).
TRAILS Impacts Knowledge
TRAILS has asymmetrical impacts, meaning an unaccountable government can pick
winners and losers (Wilson, 1989). Thus, it is the essence of the regulatory ecosystem that any
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TRAILS action by individuals in government will impact individual human activity, therefore
business activity (von Mises, 2016; Wilson, 1989).
Without anti-competitive actions, the government cannot compete with private
companies if the industry is competitive (Ahlseen, 1993). The profit motive generates innovation
and creative destruction that is not present in governmental entities, and trust is destroyed if the
government enters the private industry as a competitor. Individuals in governments also lack the
private sector's skills and the understanding of creative destruction knowledge acquisition. Thus,
the government’s role is to right-size TRAILS.
Macroeconomics vs. Microeconomics
The tension in TRAILS right-sizing should be evaluated by microeconomics, a form of
methodological individualism. The minimalist microeconomic approach is consistent with the
natural law of assessing TRAILS. The system takes as a given the world is chaotic and that chaos
is natural order, by definition, uncontrollable (Hayek, 1945, 1948, 1955; Hazlitt, 1959, 1988;
Schumpeter, 1939, 1942; von Mises, 2015). Thus, humility, decentralization, and antifragility are
required to negotiate the impossibly complex business environment (Hayek, 1988). Therefore,
TRAILS are made at the micro-level on a decentralized basis creating an anti-fragile
environment that gets stronger with chaos due to knowledge creation (Gilder, 2013, 2018; Taleb,
2005, 2007, 2012, 2020). The natural order is innate behaviors, complex adaptive interrelated
systems, and natural selection (Rothbard, 2007, 2009b). Attempts to control, eliminate, or
equalize chaos result in an absurd folly that causes increased chaos by seen market corrections
and monopolies, unseen depressed growth and prosperity, and, ultimately, calamity (De Weaver,
2020; Schumpeter, 1934, 1939).
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The other theory evaluated for tension arbitration of TRAILS is macroeconomics. It has
directed the TRAILS policy, unabated, since the 1960s, with the fundamental premise that
macroeconomics can control and steer the chaos using TRAILS (Conrad, 2020; Samuelsson,
1964, 1985, 1989; Stiglitz, 1984, 1987, 2007). The self-anointed sees chaos requiring their
management with a group of determinatives guessing from afar experts (Hayek, 1960). The
macro-TRAILS are controlled centrally by the self-anointed few and their agents, with little
input from practitioners, including the business individual, who they do not trust because they
know too much (Boettke & O'Donnell, 2013; Christensen, 1993; Conrad, 2020; Keynes, 1926,
1935; Samuelson, 1989, 2007).
Micro Business Economics Concerning TRAILS
Microanalysis, which governs sensible TRAILS decisions, begins with understanding the
first rule of economics: scarcity (Hausman, 2009, 2018). There is never a sufficient amount of a
thing to mollify all who desire that thing. In business, there is a finite amount that the business
can produce. The follow-on theory to address scarcity is choice. The choice must be made
because individuals, business entities, or the economy cannot have everything they desire
(Hausman, 2009, 2018). The theory that follows is that choices are made based on the individual
or firm maximizing the utility of decisions, sometimes referred to as opportunity cost analysis or
marginal benefit analysis (Bastiat, 2007; Menger, 1883). Lastly, there is no free lunch; every
choice is a trade-off of cost and benefits of equal or unequal measures. Maximizing utility is
when benefits exceed the cost. Indifference is when benefits equal costs. Destroying utility is
when the cost exceeds benefits (Friedman, 1957, 1970). TRAILS dilemma decisions should be
made to create incentives that facilitate behaviors that enable the firm to maximize utility in the
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form of outcomes or performance metrics (Friedman, 1962, 1970; Schumpeter, 1942; Sweezy,
1943). TRAILS that cause friction to the above process are wrong-sized.
Right-sizing Defined
Right-sized TRAILS are defined as those that create a healthy environment for business
performance. The central political sophism of TRAILS is in the short-run on particular groups
and to belittle other groups and the long-run effects. The right-sized TRAILS consists in looking
not merely at the immediate but at more prolonged effects of any act or tracing the consequences
of that policy not merely for one group but all groups. Sowell (2001, 2012, 2019) suggests that
90% of TRAILS fail. So potential TRAILS should be judged against that benchmark of doing
nothing as a credible alternative, and all alternative TRAILS should be examined against each
other. All determinations should be conducted with the premises that reason, reality, and logic to
the contradictions and real-world data from those with the most skin in the game. Right-sizing
TRAILS is ultimately an ordinal process (trade-offs), not cardinal.
Research Design and Approach
This study employs empirics methodology as foundational and incorporates the appealing
grounded insights of an interpretivist where appropriate. That approach yields a better value
analysis if both knowledge vectors put a premium on the interviewees' experience and where
both facts and theory matter. The deduction portions of the research examined existing or created
theories for validation and falsification. Abduction portions of the research are performed on
inductive and inductive outcomes using imaginative interpretation, the reasoning for mental
leaps of cognitive logic of discovery, yet still consistent with fealty to the inductive and
deductive portions of the research.
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Data Collection Methods and Instruments
Because the phenomena are social and the research is to gain the most exhaustive data
from business executives, a qualitative approach is appropriate. Business executives have rich
and in-depth knowledge of real-world impacts, insights, and understanding of right and wrongsized TRAILS. The business executive can be classified as elite for interviews due to power,
position, prestige, and specialized knowledge (Aguinis & Solarino, 2019). Executives possess
concrete knowledge that no other class does on the impact of TRAILS on business performance.
They have an extensive field of vision and can substantially ground the phenomena. I am peer
level to the executives, which allowed the rare opportunity to extract elite data from executives
(Aguinis & Solarino, 2019; Hochschild, 2009; Marshall & Rossman, 2014; Stewart, et al. 2017).
Elite executive interviews are a data extraction method that can provide deep insights
(Hochschild, 2009; Miles et al., 2014; Welch et al., 2002). The findings were used to triangulate,
enhance, and validate or contradict findings in the literature reviews, source material, and
abstractions. More critically, the data provided rich data to interrogate using the most flexible
process for grounding the evidence for theory building. The instrument of data collection was an
open-ended questionnaire, which reduces bias (Miles et al., 2014).
Measures and Data Analysis
The study had two distinct phases. The first was a qualitative exploratory phase with five
executives. The second, the qualitative empirical phase, went further in-depth with additional
interviews of executives. Data grounding, visualizations with iterative maneuverings, narrative
analysis, case study among executives, and observations and quantitative sources and other
qualitative data were utilized for triangulation, sensemaking, mental cogitation for theory
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building, and data reduction for teleological and asymmetrical metaphysical discoveries
(Charmaz, 2016; Denscombe, 2010; Konecki, 2008a, 2008b, 2009, 2011; Taleb, 2012).
A supplement for methods and process that addresses in more detail triangulation, ethics,
bias, memoing, note-taking, visualizations, authenticity, beneficence, disconfirming evidence,
environment, codes, and exemplars can be found in Appendix C.
Process
Procedure steps 1 through 4 in Figure 9 show the exploratory phase through to
preliminary findings. First, the exploratory process verified that the method, process, fit,
analysis, and instruments were appropriate for the empirical study. For the empirical portion,
steps 1 to 9 in Figure 9 were performed. Coding was overlayed to the existing coding to identify
and confirm patterns, interrelationships, consistencies, and outliers. The discovery process was
emergent and non-linear.
Coding
All data, generally, was line by line coded to nodes in each of the following cycles
(Figure 13 in Appendix D). The first cycle (inductive) utilized the ABBO model, literature
review for context of data, and grouped the emergent data themes into six related unnamed
groupings. The second cycle coding, focus coding, was used for clarifying, defining, and
expanding necessary pieces within sets of the first cycle. The number of categories, themes,
concepts, or groupings can get smaller or larger as first coding is expanded for exactness, clarity
as new consequential knowledge and subject comes to light, or reduced for themes within packs
that are similar. The second cycle can be inductive, deductive, and or abductive. The codes are
inferential or explanatory, ones that identify a bigger picture configuration or compositional
clarity as integrations are untangled and relationships and patterns are more fully absorbed.
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Figure 9
Methods, Process, and Analysis Flow Chart

The second cycle becomes the reservoir of pertinent data in an assessable fashion. The second
cycle groupings of codes were again six, with specific codes from first cycle codes eliminated,
reallocated, or expanded among the six similar groups. They are:
1. Healthy environment requires individuals to make micro-decisions that maximize
perceived utility
2. Unintended consequences or unseen unintended consequences
3. Methodological individualism exists, perhaps especially with large groups and
Hayek’s “knowledge problem” and the “pretense of knowledge” of government
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4. Interference of the invisible hand of innovation and market. Optimal coherence,
asymmetrical antifragile knowledge acquisition, optimizes, outcomes
5. Only the government can legally provide enforcement in the area of commerce
6. Misunderstanding winner and losers of TRAILS
The third cycle coding contemplated assertions, hypotheses, and condensed and
synthesized vast amounts of data, individual observations, and analysis to six preliminary
summary principles: Knowledge Creation, Unintended Consequences, Ignorance, Market Forces,
Micro-Inaction, and Winner–Loser. Abstract abductive spark led to four additional coding
cycles. The third cycle revealed most TRAILS that are wrong-sized TRAILS violated the
Founding Documents (FD), apodictic economic principles (AEP) and the Contemporary
TRAILS Paradigm (CTP). The data was subsequently coded to FD, AEP, and CTP related nodes.
See Appendix D for a detailed description of the coding for each cycle.
Process Flow
The process coding flow starts with the first, second, and third coding cycles to arrive at
six preliminary principles to right-size TRAILS (Figure 10). Meta-physical abductive sparks
motivated comparisons of the data to FD, AEP, and CTP themes. From the third cycle at circle 1
and FD, AEP, and CTP at circle 2 (Figure 10) emerged a matrix for micro dilemma decision for
right-sizing TRAILS. At circle 3, qualitative tools were used to enhance and create depth for the
matrix.
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Figure 10
Coding Process Flow

The final coding of the Matrix, related metaphors, and exemplars emerged for rightsizing and wrong-sizing TRAILS for substance and ease of presentation and understanding. The
metaphors abductively determined for the TRAILS matrix were: Umpire, Cobra, Broken
Window, and Chillax. From the Matrix emerged enhancements to the third cycle six principles,
which were critically evaluated, leading to four propositions to right-size TRAILS for a healthy
business environment, from which four practical implications became evident (Circle 5).
As the last validation and integrity double-check, the four implications were checked
against the TRAILS of the land law and the data at circle 6. I checked the propositions back to
the data and the implications to the FD to make sure that they were well grounded. I called this
verification step the Hold Up step.
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Study Population and Sample
This research sought to find insights from experienced business executives on the impact
of TRAILS on business performance. Elite interviews were theoretically sampled on a
purposeful and judgmental basis based on position, power, and specialized knowledge
(Hochschild, 2009; Miles et al., 2014; Palinkas et al., 2015). The sample was not randomized and
was driven by purpose and expertise to understand what the target population thinks (Aberbach
& Rockman, 2002). It was a homogeneous sampling focused on qualifying people specific to the
purpose of the study (Miles et al., 2014).
My network of senior executives has meaningful public company experience with
TRAILS and its impact on incentives, behaviors, and business performance. One qualifying
criterion was that each had to be an insider defined by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC). The SEC defines an insider as a director, senior officer, or individual that owns more than
10% of a public company's voting shares. The term public company is a firm whose securities
are traded on the public markets.
After 10 empirical interviews, no additional sparks of mental abduction insights were
gleaned from other interviews, and saturation was reached for the empirical study.
The sample selected was homogeneously faithful to the purpose. The sample size was 12,
within the guidelines for purpose and elite interviews (Charmaz, 2014). All participants were
selected over 11 months ending in April 2021. Five exploratory interviews were conducted under
the same selection criteria, methods, and approach, bringing the actual total of interviewees
effectively to 17 (Table 2).
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics of Interviewees
Details of Elite Executives Interviewed
Category
Exploratory
Empirical
Number of elite interviews
5
12
Collective years worked
Apprrox. 150
Approx 500
Collective Market Cap
$1 Trillion
$3 Trillion
Average Age
45
Approx. 55
Ave different industries
5
6
Ave number of degrees
2
2
VP or higher
All
All
Industries represented (SEC - SIC codes A - K eleven)
Ten
Ten
Companies represented:
AARAMCO, Activison, Blizzard, CBRE, Charles Schwab, Comcast, Disney, Drexel Burnham Lambert, Ernst & Young,
First American Financial, Fortis, FUTU, Goldman Sachs, JLL, Keck Medical, Koll, Kenneth Leventhal, Lehman Brothers, NBC
MCA INC., Nestle, UCLA Medical Center, MGM, Mills Corp, Price Waterhouse, Sheppard Mullin, Seagram, Six Flags,
Technicolor, Trammelcrow, Tropicana, Universal Music, Universal Filmed Entertainment, Universal Studios, Vivendi, WWE
Zurich. Smaller public and private companies is the pharmaceutical, gaming, gambling, on-line retail, FINRA compliance,
health care, real estate, bricks and mortar retail, data centers, broker dealer, private equity and angel equity companies.

Total
17
Approx. 650
$ 4 Trillion
52
6
2
All
Ten

Note. List reflects the full career background of the executives interviewed, average four per executive.

The sample selection was a clustering of executives over the research period, giving me
the time to analyze and digest the data, reflect, and develop theory-building cogitations
periodically (Charmaz, 2006, 2014). Follow-on selections were judgmentally chosen based on
those reflections and aim of the study, while mindful of such selections’ position (Denscombe,
2010), specialized knowledge (Creswell & Creswell, 2017), peer status relationship (Aberbach &
Rockman, 2002), potential power imbalance, and any other factor that could bias or impair or
adversely influence the study in terms of neutrality (Miles et al., 2014).
Assumptions and Ethical Considerations
The matching and convergence of themes among independent participants using an openended questionnaire is a robust validation measure (Creswell & Creswell, 2017). Despite
participants being from vastly different industries, interviews produced directionally and
thematically the same observations. The details differed, but the impact of TRAILS on business
and related experiences generally coalesced around themes, with no new themes emerging after
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the 10th interview. No participants had significantly contradictory experiences, with the
compositions based upon determining wrong-sized TRAILS and right-sized TRAILS. There
were no materially unique and differentiated experiences among the executives that rose
to separate exception disclosure or conflicting theory.
Preliminary Findings
Implication for the Foundational Starting Point
The consistency of these executives' reactions to the impact of regulations on business
performance can be attributed to their incentives. Executives have incentives to be right when
making business decisions and disincentives for being wrong. The implication is that guidance
from the principles that emerged in the study can be materially applicable to all for-profit
businesses and across industries.
Structure of Presentation from Exploratory through to Empirical Findings
Due to the complex integrated and integral nature of the phenomena and the research
design, there is no linear structure of findings. The exploratory phase informed the empirical
phase. The following lays out the rationalization and presentation to be faithful to the process
and the information gathered. As is typical in grounded theory, data are interpreted into a theory
that makes the information cognitively capturable to understand and remember a complex and
critical matter. The preliminary findings are more meaningful by developing a theory to capture
meaning. The theory also enables the interpretation of diverse and complex facts to validate the
observations and abstractions and understand and interpret the reality of the phenomena.
An insightful contribution to both academic and practice knowledge was built from the
data. A matrix diagram started construction during the exploratory phase. It was finalized during
the empirical stage as a conceptual framework to classify TRAILS phenomena as regulatory
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action, inaction, and uneven action. The matrix emerged in a semi-teleological fashion, which
underpins the grounded visualizations of abstract thought and critical thinking. This
methodology fundamentally is the process for the entirety of the empirical study.
The data was taken in from the executives observed through patterns, correlations, and
weighting on the impact of TRAILS on business performance. Some TRAILS are right-sized,
and others are wrong-sized. That process was performed during the exploratory phases. Further,
two types of right-sized TRAILS emerged, which led to one of the dimensions of the matrix:
1) There was an appropriate role for TRAILS and
2) It was not appropriate for government to intervene.
From the interviews, three ways in which TRAILS harm the business environment emerged:
1) TRAILS in an inappropriate area or inappropriate overregulation, or
2) By intervention via stimulus or not enforcing appropriate regulation or unequal
enforcement of relevant laws.
Also emerging from the interviews as to why wrong-sized TRAILS are not enforced is the notion
that only the government can legally provide enforcement in certain areas of commerce. Most
findings from the exploratory and empirical phases fit into those four categories.
Empirical Findings
The matrix development was aided by using the procedures noted above on the empirical
data to tease out six principles to right-size TRAILS. In addition, four propositions of the new
theory are in the findings and four implications for practice that are responsive to the research
question. Furthermore, wrong-sized monetary TRAILS emerged from the data as an important
TRAILS to right-size (Rothbard, 1990, 2002, 2007; von Mises, 1981, 2007, 2012). The findings
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generally follow the above flow with an appreciation for the complexity, integral and interrelated
nature of the phenomena, cross disciplines, and systemic necessity.
The task for the empirical study was to get evidence that would be consistent with the
proposed conceptual framework for right-sizing TRAILS or invalidate the tenets and bring it to
life with exemplars to make it more useable, and ultimately, to build theory on right-sizing and
wrong-sizing of TRAILS. Detailed exemplars are classified into each of the four categories
which can be seen in more detail in Figure 11.
Figure 11
The Impact of TRAILS Action, Inaction, and Uneven Action on Performance
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The four categories are:
1) Umpire, Type 1 TRAILS: Facilitates commerce with the government as an arbiter.
2) Cobra, Type 2 TRAILS: Inappropriate regulation. TRAILS of good intentions disrupt or
influence markets adversely with unintended consequences that may or may not be
identified.
3) Broken Windows, Type 3 TRAILS: Government stimulus and intervention or
government not performing TRAILS enforcement role. The consequences are adverse
and unseen opportunity costs to the business environment.
4) Chillax, Type 4 TRAILS: The regulator is a fan in the stands, not a player nor arbiter.
Type 1 Umpire Effects
Type 1 TRAILS are beneficial to the business environment. Type 1 recognizes the
government's role for business performance. The executives could speak about any TRAILS they
wanted. However, only 11.5% of the aggregated interview time did they talk about right-size
TRAILS, suggesting that either the TRAILS that business executives see as valuable to their
firms is a small percentage of the existing regulations, or perhaps human nature is not to have
good news as top of mind as bad news. Hazlitt (1988) and Sowell (2001, 2012, 2019) contend
90% of TRAILS are wrong-sized. If 90% of businesses fail, the rate for TRAILS is in line with
initial endeavors (Lee, 2013). The difference is when the government fails, the TRAILS
continue. Nevertheless, most executives suggested some regulations are necessary.
Regarding Type 1 TRAILS, where the government acts as an umpire, a commercial
property executive noted a Type 1 TRAILS that requires proceeds from a sales transaction held
in escrow by the government until all conditions of the sale are met. This intermediary role
facilitates and assures the propriety of transactions. A Spirits executive noted TRAILS about the
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drinking age and an MD noted licensing of medical doctors: “The minimum drinking age is an
example of good regulations” and “the licensing of doctors keeps the public safe,” respectively.
Most of the right-sized TRAILS mentioned in the interviews revolved around one of six
principles derived from coding and analysis of the interviews. These principles are described next:
Principle 1: The Knowledge Creation Principle. Develop TRAILS that allow dilemma
decisions to be made that maximize knowledge creation, leading to value creation. This was
mentioned on average 3.46 times across 12 interviews. Per an entertainment executive on
lowering the corporate tax rate to conform to other countries:
So, you know, it was one of those necessary at least viewed as politically essential evils.
But this change allows us to bring a lot of money into the U.S., which allowed us to
increase U.S. projects, increase employment, and make decisions based on core elements
of the projects, not the value of tax strategy. I think it has caused all companies to focus
on their inherent risk factors and enterprise risk. And focus on there, you know, their key
metrics. So, you're not getting lost in the weeds.
You know, tone at the top is critical and all those structural things for the country. I think
some good things come out of it. The company moved people out of strategic planning
and into the operating divisions. Prior, we made some wrong decisions based on tax
arbitrage. They made money. But were terrible for the overall brand.
Type 2 Cobra Effects
Many wrong-sized TRAILS mentioned in the interviews highlighted the unintentional
effect of TRAILS, leading to wrong-sized regulations. This category of TRAILS is derived from
a story of Indian regulations. The Indian government’s concern over venomous cobras resulted in
TRAILS fees for each dead cobra. Breeders in India began to breed cobras, kill them, and collect
the fees. In response, the government used more TRAILS to end the fee for dead cobras. The
breeders, with worthless venomous cobras, set them free. The TRAILS solutions made the cobra
problem far worse. Some effects of TRAILS are not predictable, and thus real outcomes are
often unintended at some level. This phenomenon exists because it is impossible to know how
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individuals (market, in aggregate) will react to the new TRAILS, calculate the incentives, and
create new knowledge to achieve desired outcomes.
The last attempt to control executive compensation was in 2002, with Sarbanes-Oxley
(SOX). It resulted in collateral damage to SMEs. The regulation increased compensation
disclosure and the legal exposure of executives. Large companies took out insurance contracts to
protect executives, and large companies could afford the additional and complicated disclosure
to reduce exposure for the executives. SMEs could not afford the combination of insurance and
reporting costs. SOX also gave foreign companies an advantage as they are not required to
adhere to SOX. According to one executive who directs Initial Public Offerings:
Today, a US company barely has a chance to go public because of all those regulations.
They are out of compliance the moment they go public and facing massive exposure.
However, and this is the insane part. If a foreign company wants to go public in the U.S.,
they don’t have virtually any of those regulations because they are specifically exempted.
Does that make sense to you? Why is it that way?
Principle 2: The Unintended Consequences Principle. A wrong-sized TRAILS
emerges from unforeseen, unintended consequences. This was mentioned 13 times on average
per interview. For example, a CFO and EVP of a major entertainment company said the
regulators' requirement to expense half the cost of a film (prints and advertising) upon release
had seen and unseen unintended consequences:
Reasonable people, with knowledge, can disagree about what is right. But there is no
substitute for experience. Suppose you just look at the aggregate number of major studio
theatrical film releases. In that case, it has been trending down for quite a few years now
because of the regulators' change. Yeah, consumer choices are inherently limited, and
investors and employees are hurt. Yeah, I would like to make a general comment first.
Whenever you get away from what is defined as best practice accounting from best
practice operations, you will have a problem, no matter what the industry. And what the
change, [financial reporting], is it created this dichotomy of a regulatory measurement
[not real] and real economics. Certainly, in my tenure at [major entertainment company]
and other years since the change are almost useless from a management and operational
perspective, and that's not a good thing. It caused short-termism, you do uneconomic
things for the appearance of the regulators [fake] economy and sacrifice the long term for
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short term window dressing. It's even broader than that because almost every annual
public filing and some quarterly is that one picks up nowadays every company does a
reconciliation from what the regulators want and some real measure of performance;
some measure of the health of the business to operating cash flow, as opposed accounting
earnings and that's not a good thing, it's not a good thing for anybody on any side of that
discussion. It would be great. It would be nice to see reality come back into closer
harmony. Let's just say. The industry has not recovered from that regulation.
Principle 3: The Ignorance Principle. This principle arises from the notion that
policymakers often do not have the business experience or knowledge to design TRAILS that
favor business performance. This was mentioned across all interviews. Per an oil and gas
executive and family office investor:
And you know, when you look because that was back when I was in high school when all
that started going on, the shenanigans began on the monetary side. Money would be
worth in today's dollars and how that money could be used somewhere else. The
difference that I see is that business is fighting politicians who have no clue about the
long-term impact of their monetary regulations and are being manipulated by those few
who benefit from bad economic policy. Thus they can’t even really have a coherent
discussion. One side knows what they are talking about, and the other doesn’t. And the
one that doesn’t is making the regulations. It is bad enough they make the obvious,
although still hidden, errors on the fiscal side for votes or appease their oligarchical
masters. The real destruction is on the monetary regulatory side, which enables all the
harmful activity on the budgetary side. There must be a few in the Fed who understand
this and work with individuals on the nominal side who get the rest of the individuals in
Congress…It is ridiculous that very, very few people have a long-term perspective on
things, especially monetary policy coupled with governed confiscation of their monetary
handiwork with inheritance taxes.
Another example of Cobra TRAILS is executive compensation. After 28 years, the result of
“good intentions and unintended consequences” is that large company CEO compensation rose
by 514%, GDP by 100%, the S&P 500 by 129%, and medium household income by 21%
(Hughen et al., 2019). These regulations created the short-termism and an unhealthy business
environment that rewarded executives for short-term actions. When asked what the solution is,
the executive said the following:
That is easy; to correct the problem is straightforward. Let individual market forces fix
the problem. Executives will return to the extended-run maximization management for
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shareholders. But the optimate executives like being overpaid now, and they have
captured the regulators. The regulations for them now is a barrier for entry, and they like
the monopolistic position that has been created for them.
“Do they collude not to fix the problem with a market solution?” The executive stated:
Colluding isn’t even the right word. All the relevant parties just know what to do. There is
no colluding required. Money flows and grows around the regulatory environment. New
economies are created every time any legislature signs a new bill into law. It probably looks
a lot like the start-up process for companies: first, lobbyists and academia write white
papers (funded by govt. grants); second, a congressman gets a suggestion from the
leadership of an influential lobbyist who got him elected to take on a particular initiative,
curry favor and support and bring it out as a bill for a vote, where the party in power can
flog it in front of the media ad nauseum until the public starts chanting the mantra
demanding that the bill pass and that if it isn’t the opposition party is trying to murder your
grandma or suppress … Feels like the typical fundraising process from angel to seed to
Series A to strategic investment to finally a pawning off to the public the risk once public.
Follow the money.
Principle 4: The Market Forces Principle. Some TRAILS interfere with the market.
This was mentioned on average 3.8 times per interview in 11 of 12 interviews. Per a financing
CEO:
Because of compliance, it has gotten worse over time. But for sure, if we take the finance
sector with the layers upon layers of Sarbanes Oxley leading to the Dodd-Frank bill,
leading to the, you know, consumer protection bureau, headed by regulators have never
run a business before. You know that cost and layer upon layer of costs now add the state
layers. On top of that, they have made it severely consequential. If you are not compliant
and so it's a cost of doing business that was already high. Where you had to have legal
protection, and now you add those layers of knowledge and understanding. To try and
navigate that, I will tell you if you have the money in the wherewithal to try and jump into
those waters and innovate. You had natural barriers using entrepreneurial innovation for
protection. Now, they're artificial barriers of protection to keep new entrants from coming
in, and this will take you, will lead you that into my notion about [big banks], also, use it
to eliminate smaller banks.
Type 3 Broken Window Effects
This TRAILS category is based on inactions or uneven actions that bring negative
consequences for the business environment. For example, the executives interviewed often
mentioned a lack of regulations to restrict illegal or anti-competitive behavior. An executive in
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the entertainment industry noted that, in 1999, they had the government to negotiate on their
behalf with China. At the time, the entertainment industry was the number two exporter in the
U.S. The executive noted the entertainment industry got no protection. They felt the government
sacrificed the entertainment industry for other sectors. This executive said:
We never saw any meaningful government action that resulted in any benefit to us. I go
further and say that we never really saw any government action period, if I was to
speculate about intent or plan or motivation, in fact, the word. The same degree of
position within the economy as Aerospace didn't have the same number of employees.
We were very geographically concentrated in southern California and, perhaps to a lesser
extent, in New York. But, unfortunately, one has to say political clout as an industry.
Because Mr. and Mrs. public, we're going to be much more swayed by tales of woe from
a Boeing or a major manufacturer with the labor-intensive workforce than they were
going to be by a bunch of Hollywood cry babies who… you know…
This executive noted that the government did little in the U.S. to protect intellectual property and
the industry has no enforcement mechanisms. As a result, music and home video sales in the
U.S. have been reduced by more than 50%, and the entertainment industry is out of the top 10 in
terms of exports. Specifically, the executive noted:
I also think it plays into the issue of you know whether the government cares about your
industry. Up to and including the moment here, there has never really been the rigorous
defender of U.S. intellectual property that it should have been. I have heard the argument
that said don't worry, you know, over time, these guys will come into line, and they'll join
the world and on and on and on and is the situation, but it's far from solid yeah and then
there, then, there have been historically so yeah we felt we felt as if we didn't have a
voice.
Principle 5: The Micro-Decisions Inaction Principle. Create a healthy business
environment for individuals to make micro-decisions that maximize rents. Not enforcing rightsized TRAILS will lead to adverse outcomes. This was mentioned an average of 2.9 times in 10
of 12 interviews. Per a music industry CEO, an example of how the government did not create a
healthy environment by inaction:
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And nearly out of the blue in spring of 1999, Napster emerges as a large-scale illegal
fencing operation operating in a context lacking the usual functioning legal
framework. Imagine anybody walks into a record store, steals CDs, then goes into an
empty lot next door and sells them to other people for cash. There would have
been enforceable points in law applied in the physical world to stop that from
happening. Thieves could not have gotten out the front door of the record store easily, let
alone conduct a transaction in the parking lot next door, without fear of enforcement. By
contrast, there was no legal framework that governed the Napster situation online, and the
government showed little interest in protecting the music industry. To repeat, there was
no enforced legal framework to deal with what was an illegal fencing operation. The CD
was an open master, and Napster and others created technology to rip the content off of
the CD, disaggregate it into songs, and make it available for free to people over the web
in a very convenient kind of way. Free is the most powerful word in the dictionary
almost. I'm telling you it's 20 years later -- there's no new business model that can
compete successfully against an identical product offered for free.
One significant broken window effect is the side effects of regulatory efforts to create an
economic stimulus. Bastiat (2007) developed the theory of unintended consequences of two
types: seen and unseen. First, to stimulate the economy, a stone is thrown and shatters a
shopkeeper’s window. Second, the aggregate of city’s individuals is the broken window is an
economic benefit. The owner must buy a window from a company and pay an individual to
install it. The window company and installer now have money to spend. That, in theory,
stimulates the economy. However, society ultimately pays the cost of the broken window, and
the owner has less money for employees and innovation, which would make the business more
profitable. Higher profits would enable more reinvestment to invigorate the virtuous cycle of
Individualism’s creation of knowledge, wealth for the owner, the health of the business
environment, and wealth in society both economically and civilly. That unseen loss in value is
called opportunity cost. An insurance executive provides an example:
The state through regulations has taken over some of the most profitable segments of the
insurance industry under the pretense of protecting the public [“breaks window,”
government pays itself] and comingling the collected premiums with the general fund. I
suspect the state will expect emergency Federal funding if claims exceed whatever
premiums they have retained [society pays] and the insurance industry has less money for
innovation [opportunity costs unseen cost to the industry and society].
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One form of the broken window effect comes from TRAILS that are applied unevenly
across players. Wrong-sized TRAILS affect some players less or more than others, creating an
unfair competitive environment. In addition, there is inaction in that there is a lack of precaution
on TRAILS design to avoid uneven burden across players. For example, executives in this study
were victims or beneficiaries of COVID-19 TRAILS. The event had uneven impacts on the
companies of interviewees. According to the interviews, the effects ranged from devastating to
unaffected to beneficial.
Principle 6: The Winner-Loser Principle. Wrong-sized TRAILS can emerge as they
unevenly benefit or harm different players. This was mentioned across all 12 interviews. For
example, a CEO in the restaurant industry stated:
It is pretty messed up with regulations. So let's start with your first question; consider the
largest of two regulations that impact your business favorably or unfavorably. I think they
are minimum wage and labor laws the other environmental or conservation regulations.
And one of the big ones is ADA [American Disabilities Act] regulations. The negative
impact of minimum wage is obvious anytime they increase it. There is less employment
and margins are squeezed, and expansion or investment in business decreases. The other
one is the environmental and conservation regulations; these can add considerable costs to
a development project depending on the size of the restaurant. I had a restaurant owner
build a restaurant, and he said: These regulations not only have slowed me down six months
on my building process, but it cost me another $150,000 to finish this restaurant because
of the regulations. So ADA regulations have had a deep and meaningful impact,
particularly on the smaller restaurant owners. When the ADA regulations were passed, I
think it was the 90’s under Bush. It cost restaurant owners 10’s of thousands of dollars to
convert their restaurant to ADA compliance. Yep, and there was a huge unintended
consequence, or perhaps intended by the lawmakers, some attorneys saw an opportunity to
sue these small restaurants and make tens of thousands by claiming the restaurant violated
the ADA Act. These attorneys would either hire people in wheelchairs, or the attorney
would do it themselves and go into the restaurant to determine the violations and often hold
the restaurant owner hostage to a huge lawsuit that the legislators encouraged. Hundreds
of restaurant owners had to pay 10’s of thousands as ransom to avoid racking huge legal
bills. So that's three regulations hurting the restaurant business, and the lawmakers just
keep on adding cost.
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Note that personal industry (PI) lawyers wrote the ADA law in the 1990’s. President Bush noted
upon signing that there:
…may have been concerns that the ADA may be too vague or too costly, or may lead
endlessly to litigation. But I want to reassure you right now that my administration and
the U.S. Congress have carefully crafted this Act. We've all been determined to ensure
that it gives flexibility, particularly in terms of the timetable of implementation, and
we've been committed to containing the costs that may be incurred
(National Archives, July 26, 1990).
One particular concern on the uneven effects of wrong-sized TRAILS raised during the
interviews is the negative impacts on innovation and entrepreneurship. According to an
executive, Dodd-Frank harmed small firms, increasing the oligarchical capture of large banking
firms, and reduced entrepreneurial innovation:
I was at Charles Schwab at that time. Charles Schwab could navigate those waters and
negotiate and come to settlements quietly. But a small broker-dealer who's doing
innovative stuff creates value by creating jobs down at a very low level because they're
helping through private placement offerings or helping through venture capital
investment into innovating companies; those people got wiped out. There was no more
incentive for those people who are licensed under FINRA to stay in business. So they
wiped a lot of people out. Schwab got through the gates because regulations had not
caught up with innovations and [personal computers] and it was before Dodd-Frank was
enacted.
The executive went on to say that not only does regulation make the core financial business
untenable, but it eliminated the former advantage small firms had, entrepreneurial innovation.
The results of regulation make the industry less entrepreneurial and more financially innovative,
which accrue only to the larger firms due to the scale necessary for such financial innovations:
But the innovation that has brought value to an end consumer that regulators have always
been-- at least giving lip service the SEC [says] that they're protecting. That innovation is
stifled again because we got entrench players and financial services. Still, like water
through your fingers, entrepreneurial individuals are less knowledgeable but technically
outside the grasp of the government, regulators, and oligarchs inventing Robo-advisors.
We have all these other innovations occurring outside of the context of being a brokerdealer. But…importantly, I think, to this point is big companies have the team of lawyers
that can pore through the-- what it is? Isn't there more regulation in Dodd-Frank, which is
the banking regulation, than all previous regulations? By the way, all under the pretense
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to protect individuals, supposedly. Yet, who's harmed usually in this heavily regulated
environment? The freedom of choice by consumers to pick and find good solutions for
themselves. No, it's not. But that's right because there's an implicit assumption that this
person is informed, right? So this is why the regulations are less for those people. But
think about that. They did that to free up funding that would go towards companies that
need it to innovate.
Another executive added on the impact on attracting young talent:
It's interesting with FINRA, they're trying to get people into the industry, but because the
hurdles are so high and the rewards aren't there, they can't get people to go into the
industry. You'll be insane if you go as an individual as it becomes a broker-dealer. I
mean, what would be your incentive to go? And Charles Schwab did it. Think well when
he did it, right, back in the 70s-He couldn't do it today. --and he created a very disruptive
business.
An executive with private equity experience in the financial sector noted the elimination and
self-censoring that TRAILS causes on innovation by the most entrepreneurial innovators in the
financial industry:
The level of knowledge you need to navigate the regulatory environment to come up with
an entrepreneurial solution is cost-prohibitive, and it limits the number of people who can
innovate. It's only because you have this special knowledge that you can innovate. So it's
created protection for those that know, interestingly enough? So our innovators are risktakers. They assess risk differently. They don't necessarily take on more risk, but they do
not know when they think of a solution. Had the cryptocurrency person been a FINRA
licensed broker-dealer, could that have happened? They probably would have said, ‘No
[expletive] way. Too risky for me. I'm out.’ It took a 25-year-old or whomever these
anonymous people who originally did bitcoin or Mpesa out of Kenya, which require the
power of an oligarchical non-broker-dealer (Vodaphone), who could hit back. The banks
desperately tried to kill the innovation took those people to say, why not because I'm not
constrained by holy [expletive] what could happen to me? Can I go to jail? Can I lose all
my money that I've managed to save because the regulators are going to come down on me
or interpret the regulations for having just tried to do something?
Another 37-year veteran of the financial sector thought it essential to understand the
debilitating cost structure of a broker-dealer due to regulations has caused many of them to go
out of business:
These requirements have caused a considerable consolidation, or broker-dealers simply
go out. The broker-dealer withdraws, but they cannot stay in business. And the
requirements of the security exchange commission by the tests that we apply to what is a
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security and what is not a security is very far, and overreaching, all five oversight
agencies and quasi agencies are funded by the fines they level on their members.
They noted this perverse incentive caused one of their smaller clients to go out of business and
was fined $1 million for a real estate matter unrelated to the broker-dealer. This participant noted
that big firms do everything behind closed doors with regulators. They have no admissions of
guilt and continue to have record profits as smaller competition goes out of business.
Type 4 Chillax Effects
The absence of regulations that create incentives for knowledge creation may lead to
adverse consequences, which leads to Type 4 TRAILS. A global video game CEO observed how
the government negotiated weak trade deals for intellectual property on behalf of the
entertainment industry (i.e., films, television, music) with China. Further, the U.S. government
did not, or was incapable, of enforcing even weak protections. Therefore, the CEO had to
negotiate with companies in China and with the Chinese government to protect company
property. Nevertheless, it became the biggest market for the company. Moreover, these
protections did not require U.S. government involvement. Effectively, the government stood on
the sidelines while the firm negotiated with Chinese firms and their government to protect
company IP and succeed commercially.
Implications for Theory and Practice
The purpose of the qualitative grounded theory-based study of elite executives was to
gain knowledge of the real-world impact of TRAILS on business performance by understanding
the incentives and consequential perspectives of business executives, to propose theory on
TRAILS right-sizing, and provide a conceptual framework for a healthy business environment.
The study was conducted with the premises that reason, reality, and logic to the contradictions
and real-world data from those with the most skin in the games will reduce some of the extreme
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epistemic polarity of the TRAILS phenomena to concerned stakeholders. This section
summarizes findings and combines those findings with the ABBO and right-sizing matrix
models to establish four propositions for advancing theory.
Theoretical Propositions
Propositions were built by integrating the study’s results and principles with the three
proprietary integrated theoretical frameworks from the research to understand similarities,
differences, and incompleteness for theory building.
Proposition 1
The incentives and business performance outcomes generated by TRAILS must be
considered for TRAILS right-sizing.
The first theoretical proposition aligns with and integrates Principles 1
(Knowledge Creation Principle) and 3 (Ignorance Principle) with the ABBO model.
According to this model, the business ecosystems are constantly iterating, immediately
and temporally, as sensible TRAILS are constructed congruent with the regulatory
philosophy. Subsequently, business executives interpret the TRAILS in the market
process and rationalize scarce resources to incentivize optimal utility and outcomes as
determined by performance measures. However, that process does not include a proactive
role for business executives in government. Instead, there is a continuous evaluative
process by business individuals of beliefs of existing TRAILS as the calculus is
reinterpreted observations of occurrences downstream in the ABBO model, from
TRAILS to incentives to performance. This process manifests itself by firms acting and
reacting to the regulatory environment.
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The following observations embedded in the empirical findings highlight why there is a
gap in the knowledge base necessary to right-size TRAILS:
•

The government rarely involves the executive business practitioner, an influential
position in the policy, and only does so when the firm will benefit from TRAILS.

•

Regulators pay no penalty for being wrong. Thus, there are no incentives to avoid
wrong-sized TRAILS, which results in a lack of consequential knowledge.

•

Because of the knowledge problem, regulators cannot easily value or price TRAILS as
there is no private property or market price on inputs when the government is
involved. Thus, they cannot discern whether TRAILS are right-sized or not.

Consequently, there is a gap in knowledge to right-size TRAILS. This gap is addressed in
the next theoretical propositions and practical implications on how to right-size TRAILS.
Proposition 2
TRAILS right-sizing can only happen by considering unintended consequences.
The testimonies of the participants align with the Bastiat’s broken windows fallacy,
which suggests that in the effort to regulate a business environment to stimulate the economy, the
negative consequences for the business environment can offset the benefits. For example, one
could argue that Keynesian and Friedman monetary policy (von Mises, 2007, 2015; Rothbard,
2002) follow the axiom that societal wealth is eliminated by the ‘seen’ full measure cost of the
TRAILS stimulus (e.g., Bastiat’s society’s cost of repair – first order), which negates any
second-order stimulus velocity by the benefactor (e. g., Bastiat’s repair person). This proposition
aligns with the enlightening insight of ‘unseen’ impairment of the knowledge acquisition, unseen
third-order impact (e.g., Bastiat’s unseen disruption of entrepreneurial innovation cycle), which
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created a lost opportunity (cost), specifically as encapsulated in Principles 1 (Unintended
Consequences), 4 (Market Forces), and 6 (Winner-Loser).
Proposition 3
Unintended consequences from TRAILS can inhibit innovation.
The results are consistent with the notion that anytime the government engages in wrongsizing, the invisible hands of entrepreneurial innovation and the market are disrupted and,
therefore, so is the competitive landscape (Aghion et al., 2018). The fourth level unseen adverse
consequence is of the violated party’s industry. The unequal treatment of one industry participant
makes the entire industry less competitive (Aghion et al., 2018). The fifth unseen level is the
adverse consequences of the wrong-sized TRAILS beneficiary’s industry. The sixth-level harm
is to adjacent industries of the beneficiary and victim’s industries impairment. The seventh-level
harm is if the government takes an active ongoing role, acting as the repair shop, as trust in the
business environment will be lost. The repair shop will be operated sub-optimally and even
purposefully poorly for self-enrichment (based on Proposition 1 and the Ignorance principle).
The unequal treatment of one industry participant can make the entire industry less
competitive. Wrong-sized TRAILS that artificially help or harm a company or industry can
flatten, straighten, or retard the innovation growth curve and create suboptimal behaviors by both
the victim and the beneficiary. This harm is seen at the industry level. The disruption makes
industries less competitive and develops less entrepreneurial knowledge (i.e., less wealth). Civil
achievements and elevations have one commonality, economic performance (Friedman &
Schwartz, 1963). This proposition aligns with Proposition 1 and, depending on the situation, it
can stem from inhibiting market forces (Principle 4), picking winners and losers (Principle 6), or
government inaction that fails to protect innovators (Principle 5).
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Proposition 4
Government inaction can also lead to wrong-sizing.
Government inaction to perform their inherent duties, while not as evident as direct
investment and proactive legislation, can be every bit as destructive to business as proactive
TRAILS. The essence of the regulatory ecosystem is that any government inaction (creation or
enforcement) on right-sized TRAILS will impact human activity as individuals respond and
adapt to the corrupted environment. Therefore, business activity, innovation, and market
dynamics will be disrupted. Such action is anti-competitive and results in an impairment of the
trust in the government, which makes for an unhealthy business environment. This proposition
aligns with Principle 5 (Micro-Decision Inaction) and is at interplay with the prior propositions,
since there can be inaction because business executives are not involved in understanding
unintended consequences and the impact on innovation.
Implications for Practice
Wrong-sized TRAILS can harm the business environment, so how can they be right-sized
in practical terms?
Implication 1
Develop polycentric communities for industries for right-sizing TRAILS and government.
One promising avenue to right-size TRAILS is to develop transparent, decentralized,
self-regulating bodies across industries that co-sign TRAILS between business executives. This
would give an equal voice to non-oligarchs to develop a right-sized regulatory framework for all
business-related TRAILS, including a judiciary to adjudicate disputes among entities and
consumers.
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The development of self-regulatory bodies involving both business executives and
regulators could be a structural mechanism to achieve TRAILS right-sizing, which will bring the
size of government to an appropriate level for a healthy business environment. The U.S.
government has grown as a percent of GDP from 12% in 1960 to 57% in 2020 (International
Monetary Fund, 2021; Jessop, 2017; U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2021).
Propositions 1, 2, and 3 suggest TRAILS environment can only be right-sized by
accessing the consequential knowledge of business executives. Regulators do not have
consequential knowledge and their actions are not transparent. These polycentric communities
can alleviate some of those deficiencies. Further, with greater understanding, regulators will
make TRAILS jointly with executives that are appropriately risk-adjusted to facilitate
innovations, rather than the constricting innovation and interrupting the virtuous creative
destruction cycle.
The 2009 Nobel Prize in economics awarded to Ostrom pushed this polycentric
governance to renewed attention. This more antifragile system is characterized by various
overlapping and competing units that govern based on their specific needs and capabilities
(Ostrom, 2012). It is worth noting that polycentrism is the exact opposite of polanyism (i.e.,
economic collectivism or social democracy) (Block, 2016).
The result of a polycentric system is that it allows for more adaptation, competition, and
flexibility. The idea of polycentric governance rests on seven pillars: decentralization, different
decision centers share overlapping jurisdictions, mistake management of mutual adjustment, an
emergent order, low entry and exit costs, existence of an overarching system of common law and
courts, and effective coordination at all levels based on consequential knowledge. A key to
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success of polycentric systems is to avoid the panacea problem of centralized authority with one
size fits all top-down TRAILS (Ostrom, 2012).
There are numerous examples of polycentric governance outperforming other forms of
governance. There are recent examples of cities with polycentric policies outperforming other
cities during COVID-19 (Hamish van der Ven & Sun, 2021; Pennington, 2021). Hong Kong can
be considered polycentric compared to China. HOAs, cryptocurrencies, private clubs, religious
institutions, municipalities, Co-ops, ZEDE/LEAP zones in Honduras, and sports leagues are
exemplars of polycentric governance. In 1990, Germany’s polycentric structure saved the failing
state of East Germany, with its non-polycentric central planning construct, by reunification
(Mitchell, 2019). On the same land mass, the Dominican Republic is polycentric to Haiti. It is
organized by central planning bureaucrats, has state-sponsored violence, corruption, and
economic failure, and has the lowest Human Development Index in the Western Hemisphere.
TRAILS should be made with appropriate weight to SMEs, who are often losers when
TRAILS advertently or inadvertently lead to material winners and losers. SME representation in
the regulatory process would help address this issue. Additionally, very practical and
fundamental reforms need to be considered once the wrong-sizing of TRAILS is corrected,
especially in an environment where TRAILS build on each other to create over-regulation
without any consequences. Decentralization by making these self-governing bodies local,
regional, or specialized should lead to a more appropriate size of government for business
performance, including for SMEs.
Implication 2
Eliminate government from picking winners and losers.
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The result of the study aligns with the literature that when the government through
TRAILS picks winners and losers, all six levels of the seen and unseen consequences of the
broken window fallacy are present. This causes oligarchies to harm the business environment by
disrupting entrepreneurial innovation and free markets. The competitive landscape becomes
predatory and trust, the underpinning of a healthy business environment, is lost.
Lobbyists pressuring officials to pick winners and losers needs to be addressed. For
example, top technology firms were aided early on by the government by any or all of the
following: funding, contributions in kind, favorable court rulings, tax breaks, TRAILS specific to
a company or group, and no-bid contracts which eliminate competition. 13 of 17 participants in
the study experienced anti-competitive and predatory actions by one of the government’s broken
windows TRAILS. In these situations, the participants stated they had no redress as the court was
not prosecuting apparent anti-competitive nor predatory behavior. The polycentric entities
proposed could review TRAILS enacted before approval to guard against lobbying efforts that
favor some companies or industries over others.
The government should stop having an ongoing participant relationship with private
companies by evaluating and adjudicating the polycentric courts to ensure compliance.
Otherwise, it is like in sports if the league office (government) owned a team (private industry).
The conflicts are apparent, self-interest is obvious, and trust in the system is lost. Self-governing
bodies can provide controls for these more subtle ways of picking winners and losers. For
example, all government IPs once considered for monetization should be open source. Giving IP
paid for by taxpayers to specific Silicon Valley startups is not fair to taxpayers.
Implication 3
Government should privatize its interest in all noncore charter businesses.
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Government taking an active ongoing role, including an operational role in private
industry harms the business environment (Hoppe, 2019). This implication arose from
propositions 1, 2, and 3. It permeated throughout the empirical findings related to government
nationalizing health care and banking. TRAILS in these industries were a substantial concern for
many participants.
Implication 4
The business environment must right-size monetary TRAILS before fiscal TRAILS can be
right-sized.
Certain executives noted the importance of sound money, which serves as a natural
control (quasi-market based) to right-sizing fiscal TRAILS. 71% of executives experienced the
impact of unsound money. The issue appears to be a systemic and in need of being addressed.
The enormity of the deficit and associated TRAILS is beyond the scope of the study. However,
there are encouraging right-sizing vectors to pursue, such as restructuring the Federal Reserve,
creating a basket of precious metals to support the currency, regulating synthetic financial
products and eliminating or restructuring fractional banking, decentralizing banking, requiring a
balanced budget, and direct democracy for budget overruns (Fitts, 2020).
Limitations
There are two limitations to this study. First, it only includes business executives and
excludes regulators and consumers. This choice was deliberate because I want to bring the
perspective of business executives on the impact of TRAILS on business performance. Still, it is
not the only perspective that is valid on the topic.
Second, this study is only one of 10 requested in the call for research that includes several
areas of importance to fully understand the impact of TRAILS’ impact on business performance.
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Thus, this study is just a modest portion of the right-sizing research agenda. More research is
necessary to unveil the optimal level of regulations for business performance (the what) and the
governmental structures and processes that will structurally enable right-sizing (the how).
Implication for Future Research
The four implications for practice (i.e., polycentric communities, government not picking
winners and losers, privatizing non-core government businesses, and right-sizing monetary
TRAILS) require more research that will lead to a structural right-sizing of TRAILS; each
undertaking is massive on its own identified areas, which is beyond the scope of the research.
Each of the four can be its line of research, and there is an urgency to that request. It is not theory
that urgently needs attention. Instead, I urge the internalization of such theories and embedding
them in academia, business, government, and society to seek a healthy business environment.
Parties should collaborate with the right-sizing goal in mind.
The frameworks, principles, and theoretical propositions from this study provide
practitioners and government tools to begin the critical process of right-sizing TRAILS.
The main contributions are the ABBO Model adapted to the role of TRAILS in business
performance, the macro right-sizing diagram, the Contemporary TRAILS Paradigm, the
right-sizing matrix, and the findings of six principles for right-sizing TRAILS from the
interviews to elite executives. These principles led to theoretical propositions and
practical implications to start the path towards right-sizing TRAILS.
Conclusions
It is fair to conclude that three core TRAILS design aspects can lead to an unhealthy
business environment: unintended consequences, favoring winners over losers, and inaction. A
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business has positive outcomes when TRAILS develops and enforces the game’s rules while the
government stays on the sidelines otherwise.
According to the business executives, one key finding is that wrong-sized monetary
TRAILS are detrimental to the business environment. An oil and gas executive noted the
unsound money TRAILS started in 1971, with the TRAILS that took the currency off the gold
standard, which allowed the expansion of the government and created a plethora of wrong-sized
cobra TRAILS. When cobra TRAILS result in unintended adverse consequences, broken
windows TRAILS are often enacted. The purpose of the broken windows TRAILS is to stimulate
the economy, in part to slow down cobra effects or to bail out those harmed by cobra TRAILS.
This vicious cycle of cobra and broken windows TRAILS is not favorable for the business
environment.
Despite the reported wrong-sized TRAILS by business executives in this study, the
strength of economic liberty and the anti-authoritarian values has resulted in the U.S. being
ahead of every other country. There are multiple possible measures to gauge the benefits of a
country’s regulatory environment. Fortunately, the U.S. still leads in every meaningful category,
such as financial benefits (Elson et al., 2017), impacts on society (Carter, 2018; Goldin, 1992,
2014), innovation (Tsanova & Havenith, 2019), economy (Hannan, 2011), environment
(Bracket, 2019), and well-being of virtually all good faith stakeholders (Bebchuk & Tallarita,
2020; Cornell & Damodaran, 2020).
In general, when viewing matters such as TRAILS, there is an asymmetry between the
positive, which is difficult and takes time, and the negative, which is immediate. The bad news is
news, and progress is not news. People have a negative bias, and this could be why business
executives focused their interviewing time on wrong-sized TRAILS. Most of us obsess over the
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negative and usually catastrophize after that rather than focusing on the positive. Studies suggest
that when the world improves, we have more time and become harsher critics, which can cause
us to think that things have not gotten better. Progress is unseen and failure is a billboard.
Despite crises, there are no examples thus far of countries with established inclusive economic
liberty suffering a complete collapse (Bailey & Tupy, 2020).
Entrepreneurial innovation drives knowledge creation, which drives economic growth.
85% of inventions are due to knowledge creation and only 15% are due to capital and labor
(Eesley & Miller, 2017). American individualism has created the most innovation over the last
200 years. The U.S. is best at diffusing innovation (Bailey & Tupy, 2020). With that being said,
wrong-sized TRAILS not only harm U. S. growth but harm international markets as well.
The ABBO Model, matrix, principles, and propositions discussed in this study provide
the tools and vision to right-size TRAILS. The implications give the preliminaries of a structural
solution (quasi-market based) that aligns with the philosophy and the systemic fix to
methodological individualism inherent in individuals in government (Buchannan, 1975). Rightsizing TRAILS starts with the ABBO Model. Currently, there is no check for TRAILS adherence
to a philosophy or feedback loop for government redress if TRAILS are not enacted or enforced.
Based on the aforementioned practical implications, creating self-governing bodies and making
sure there is a level playing field in business are steps in the right direction to close the entire
loop of the ABBO model.
For TRAILS to follow a complete feedback loop in the ABBO model, they should first be
filtered through the right-sizing matrix, principles, and propositions. This should be done with
the involvement of business executives, making sure that the TRAILS do not lead to winners and
losers to the detriment of the business environment. However, the process requires checks and
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balances since it is subject to methodological individualism or, said differently, the weaknesses
of human nature. Further, it is the individual that adds the third dimensionality to the process.
Business executives reported systemic issues concerning regulators and TRAILS. It is not
just that business executives have essential experience and knowledge to right-size TRAILS, but
also, left alone, regulators with no business experience can create wrong-sized TRAILS and an
unhealthy business environment. By involving business executives in the design of TRAILS, it
is possible to right size TRAILS through a more diverse workforce, complementing the
knowledge of regulators and making it more difficult for lobbyists to manipulate them.
One significant finding reported by the business executives is that government is
involved as a player in industries beyond its charter, leading to all seven broken windows
consequences. Also, business executives interviewed underscored the problem with wrong-sized
monetary TRAILS. The business environment would welcome the leveling of the playing field
by right-sizing through avoidance of broken windows TRAILS, including wrong-sized monetary
TRAILS. Bankers would support the implication given the fees such transactions would raise.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this two-paper study was to identify the effects of regulations on business
performance and make a call for research to right-size TRAILS for a healthy environment. The
first paper consisted of a thorough cross-discipline literature review to determine the state of the
TRAILS environment for business, followed by the call for research. A micro (consequential)
study followed, by interviewing 17 business executives to examine their perspective on the rightsizing of TRAILS towards a healthy environment. One of the key objectives of this research
agenda is to help reduce epistemological polarity, based on a perspective that there must be a
right level of regulations that allows businesses across industries to thrive, which is in the best
interest of most stakeholders.
Overview of Findings
The initial impetus was to determine if Hayek’s (1960), Stigler’s (1961), and Buchanan
and Tullock’s (1962) ominous warnings that the business environment was at risk of becoming
an administrative state with wrong-sized regulations had come to fruition. These warnings are
magnified with actual economic data. Since the 1960s, there seems to be a correlation between
monetary and fiscal TRAILS as the government as a percentage of GDP increased from 12% to
57% (Figure 12). In comparison, GDP growth as a broad measure of the business environment
decreased from 4.8% to 0%.
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Figure 12
Wrong-sized TRAILS Suggest an Adverse Impact on Performance

Note. Macrotrends (2021), Federal Registry

In the call for research, one foundation I propose to right-size TRAILS in the U.S. is the
Contemporary TRAILS Paradigm (CTP), which updates the nine principles of economic liberty
in the FD for this purpose. The CTP proposes that right-sizing TRAILS for the long run using
economic liberty principles creates the fairest, most egalitarian, scientific, and moral way to
organize commerce and society to develop maximum equal opportunity for all and to reduce the
discrimination between winners and losers that is inherent when TRAILS are wrong-sized.
ABBO Model
The repurposed qualitative theoretical structure of the ABBO model (Edmondson, 1999)
was used to frame the relationship between the business environment and the TRAILS
phenomena. With beliefs consistent with the antecedents that manifest TRAILS, the business
individual (the human action factor that brings the business environment to life) internalizes the
TRAILS information and creates incentives to manifest behaviors that result in desired business
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performance outcomes. The business executive evaluates such knowledge of mistakes and
successes dynamically, continuously, and immediately, and incentives are adjusted accordingly.
Individual actions drive the classic fundamental microeconomics principle of an economic
phenomenon and interactions regarding scarce resources to meet the needs and maximize utility.
The government’s role, according to this model, is to apply its philosophy to regulate industries
and businesses in the form of TRAILS.
TRAILS Macro-View
A macro theoretical framework was developed to clarify the goal of right-sizing
TRAILS. Specifically, the framework contemplates a sweet spot of right-sized TRAILS that
maximizes knowledge and fair game for large companies and small ones. The framework also
asserts that all else being equal, wrong-sized TRAILS harms small companies
disproportionately. Such effect is often unseen in macro-aggregation as the lost business
performance of the SME’s due to wrong-size TRAILS is subsumed by large companies. There is
an excessive point of wrong-sized TRAILS that leads to market failure.
The detailed economist looks at the longer and indirect consequences; the benefits to one
group must be weighed against the harms to others. No group should be unfairly harmed for the
benefit of others. Right-sizing of TRAILS evaluates the longer-term consequences and links the
effects of that policy to all groups, not just the intended beneficiary group. The call for research
seeks to refine the framework with a call for additional studies to refine this economic model.
The request for executive input in the call for research is then addressed in the empirical study.
The call for research is based on this set of propositions and research questions (Table 3).
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Table 3
Call for Research: Propositions and Research Questions
Proposition
1. Right-sizing: There is an
appropriate level of TRAILS
for business performance
2. Wrong-sizing: TRAILS
above or below level r
harm the business
environment.
3. Wrong-sized TRAILS
favor larger firms over
smaller firms.

4. TRAILS have a
disproportionate impact
on SMEs

5. Overregulation can lead
to market failure
6. Nonenforcement of
appropriate TRAILS will be
detrimental to business
performance.
7. TRAILS that foster
innovation will favor
business performance.
8. All businesses in the
same industry should be
subject to the same TRAILS
applied consistently.

9. The Government’s
intentional stance that
leads to over-regulation
has implications on how to
right-size TRAILS

Related Research Questions

1. What is the most appropriate
measurement methodology to determine
where the U.S. is relative to right-sized
TRAILS and market failure
2. How can the impact of TRAILS on
business performance be empirically
derived, tested, and refined?
3. What TRAILS impact SMEs
disproportionally compared to large
businesses.
4. What is the impact and implications of
pandemic-induced TRAILS on large
businesses vs. SMEs?
5. How close is the U.S. business
environment to market failure?
6. What is the minimum set of TRAILS that
can favor business performance?
7. What is the appropriate role for TRAILS
in entrepreneurial innovation?
8. What are the appropriate measures and
assumptions to right-size TRAILS and to
monitor and assess TRAILS right-sizing?
9. What are the real-world perspectives,
insights, clarity, and understanding of
business executives to assist TRAILS rightsizing?
10. What mechanisms can be
incorporated into TRAILS processes to
ensure that they are implemented equally
for all types of businesses, including large
vs. SMEs and private vs. public
companies?
11. What are the differing implications of
whether wrong-sized TRAILS are
“unplanned” or “planned”?
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Comments
Fundamental assumption that drives
the call for research and theory
building.
TRAILS beyond government charter
harm knowledge, thus growth.
There is no universal agreement on
measurements or propriety, resulting in
an inadequate TRAILS phenomena and
business environment assessment. Lack
of transparency and accountability can
lead to market failure.
Right-sizing evaluates the longer-term
consequences of TRAILS and links the
effects of that policy to all groups, not
just the intended beneficiary group. No
group should be unfairly harmed for the
benefit of others.
Government cannot create
consequential knowledge at some point
of TRAILS causes market failure
Government inaction to create and
enforce right-sized TRAILS, can be
destructive to the business environment
as much as wrong-sized TRAILS.
TRAILS disruption causes the “unseen”
compounding damage to knowledge;
thus, entrepreneurial innovation
regresses, and markets are less
efficient.
Get perspectives of elite executives on
TRAILS right-sizing, who have not had a
significant voice in the literature.
Uneven or noncompetitive application
of TRAILS creates sub-optimal markets,
thus knowledge disruption, which
harms innovation.

Hayek contended regulatory capture
would be “unplanned;” others believe it
to be proactive.

Matrix
An important contribution of this research is the right-sizing dilemma decision matrix of
two positive types of TRAILS (which lead to right-sizing) and two adverse types of TRAILS
(which lead to wrong-sizing), seeking a robust view of the TRAILS phenomena. TRAILS were
classified based on action, inaction, and uneven actions and their impact on business
performance. The findings suggest that two appropriate functions in business for government are
to facilitate commerce and stay on the sidelines otherwise. Beyond that, wrong-sized TRAILS
will lead to a combination of seen or unseen impacts on growth, immediate or longer-term.
The first is good intentions TRAILS that go wrong and the second one is wrong-sized
TRAILS through interventions. An example is the classic broken windows TRAILS trying to
stimulate the economy. By omission or commission, the government may end up picking
winners and losers. The seventh layer of knowledge destruction occurs for all systemic reasons if
the government takes an ongoing role. Further, they do not have consequential knowledge and
are motivated to keep breaking the window.
The findings from the elite interviews led to six guiding principles to create a
contemporary paradigm complementary to and consistent with the FDs and the ABBO model.
These, in turn, led to theoretical and practical implications to right-size TRAILS (Table 4).
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Table 4
Principles, Theoretical Propositions, and Practical Implications
Principle
1. Knowledge
Creation
2. Unintended
Consequences
3. Ignorance

Theoretical Proposition
1. The incentives and business
performance outcomes generated by
TRAILS must be considered for TRAILS
right-sizing.
2. TRAILS right-sizing can only happen
by considering unintended
consequences.
3. Unintended consequences from
TRAILS can inhibit innovation.

4. Market Forces
5. Micro-Inaction

Practical Implications
1. Develop polycentric
communities for industries
for right-sizing TRAILS and
Government.

4. The business environment
must right-size monetary
TRAILS before Fiscal TRAILS
can be right-sized completely
3. Government should
privatize its interest in all
noncore charter businesses.

4. Government inaction can also lead
to wrong-sizing

6. Winner–Loser

2. Eliminate government from
picking winners and losers

Final Thoughts
The study’s through-line is an evidence-based framework for right-sizing TRAILS for a
healthy business environment, with the premise that reason, reality, and logic, and real-world
data should eliminate premise contradictions.
The TRAILS phenomena are an ecosystem of interrelated, integrated, and co-dependence
of self-reinforcing and iterative systems. The study uncovered that gradualism of TRAILS leads
to perpetuity in practice, as interviewees focused their time sharing their experience on wrongsized TRAILS. Government programs, once launched, rarely go away (Edwards, 2014). Also,
the government now is 57% of GDP, up from 12% in 1960 (International Monetary Fund, 2021;
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2021), which crowds out private investment, where
economic growth occurs and the reason for growth decreasing from 4.8% to 0% (Williams,
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2021). This study has only exacerbated my concern that the U.S. may be reaching an unplanned
administrative state, which can have long-term consequences to its economy and the well-being
of its sovereigns.
This study is based on the premises that Individualism generates the fairest, not perfect,
distribution of income, and productive people work many hours and or have talent and earn big
rewards under Individualism. Others may get less, but they get more than under other business
governance constructs. The poorest 20% of Americans are wealthier on average than most
nations of Europe (Agresti, 2019; Bailey & Tupy, 2020; Vásquez & Porčnik, 2019).
Any efforts towards equality of opportunity or outcome across individuals should not
interfere with the virtuous cycle of Individualism. TRAILS should not make the business
environment less healthy because it, in turn, will lead to less opportunity overall (Miron, 2011).
Finally, you will never have a perfect government, so you must improve TRAILS and manage
your mistakes constantly.
The study suggests the solution to wrong-sized TRAILS and the prospect that the U.S.
may be reaching an unplanned administrative state to the detriment of business is to move back
to the enlightenment of natural law and self-sovereignty and action forward that leads to a
healthy business environment, with equal opportunity for SMEs, where the market picks winners
and losers, and where the government limits its role to umpire in the game of business.
This study’s axioms contradict intellectual pretenses of government TRAILS beyond its
charter as worthy of intellectual pursuit. The social order is built by coordinating individual plans
and equality of opportunity, not command and control TRAILS for social or economic steerage,
which is suboptimal to start ending in a societal and economic collapse. Politicos and unelected
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bureaucrats have no role in commerce aside from their limited umpire role. TRAILS beyond that
are likely to impede knowledge and human progress.
Ideally, there is a win-win-win for individuals in business, government, and society. For
regulators, it could be attractive to decentralize, evolve, develop, and self-actualize. Of course,
the big winner is society, knowledge, business, economy, and future generations. The aim of the
study, implications, and conclusion is egalitarian, and I recognize my bias that humans are the
most valuable resource ever created and emphasize individual liberty.
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APPENDIX B: RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS
Study Title: Elite Intensive Interviews to gain an understanding of regulations (aka, TRAILS
any governmentally imposed business friction costs., Tax, Regulation/Reporting, Assessments,
Insurance, Litigation/Legal, Subsidies) on business performance measures.
Intro: Thank you for taking the time to meet with me today. My name is Brian Mulligan, a DBA
candidate from Pepperdine University. I am performing elite interviews with senior people
concerning the various impact of regulation on performance, incentives, with considerations of
periods of disruption.
Moving forward: I will be asking you a few questions that will take approximately one hour to
one hour and a half of your time. If there are any questions that you do not feel comfortable
answering, please feel free to let me know, and we can skip the question. Your responses will be
anonymous, confidential, and will be used to understand the impact of the above-identified matter
better. I will be recording our conversation to ensure accuracy and for analysis. I would like you
to be as detail and expansive as possible. Approximately fifteen other senior people have been
chosen based on their seniority, candor, sincerity, and openness for this study. If subsequently,
something is unclear to me, I may call you for clarification, although that is expected to be unlikely.
Some housekeeping:
1. Have you seen and signed the consent form?
2. Do you have any questions about the form? Do you have any questions you would like to ask
me before we get started?
3. Do I have a copy of said signed form?
Let’s get started:
1. Please tell me about your experiences with industry or commercial regulations.
Consider the largest or two regulations that impacted your business – what were they?
What did that do to your business?
How were senior people affected?
How were junior and administrative people affected?
What proactive measures did your company or you observed?
Did the regulations have a far-reaching impact or unexpected or unintended consequences on your
business, people, industry? If so, what were they?
How did the regulation change your view of government and country?
Did you take proactive measures to deal with regulators differently in the future?
Did you attempt any legal action as a resulted of the regulation? If so, what was the outcome?
How did the above make you feel?
Did the above impact your personal life, if so how and how did you deal with that?
Did the above impact the personal lives of people in your firm or other stakeholders? If so, how
and how did they deal with those impacts?
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2. Please tell me about your experiences with regulations that advantage a competitor and
not your firm – a law that disadvantage your firm vs. others in your industry?
Consider the largest or two regulations that impacted your business – what were they?
What did that do to your business?
How were senior people affected?
How were junior and administrative people affected?
What proactive measures did your company or you observed?
Did the regulations have a far-reaching impact or unexpected or unintended consequences on your
business, people, industry? If so, what were they?
How did the regulation change your view of government and country?
Did you take proactive measures to deal with regulators differently in the future?
Did you attempt any legal action as a result of the regulation? If so, what was the outcome?
How did the above make you feel?
Did the above impact your personal life, if so how and how did you deal with that?
Did the above impact the personal lives of people in your firm or other stakeholders? If so, how
and how did they deal with those impacts?
3. Please tell me about your experiences with regulators or government or the courts NOT
enforcing laws and regulations and putting your firm at a competitive disadvantage?
Consider the largest or two such situations that impacted your business – what were they?
What did that do to your business?
How were senior people affected?
How were junior and administrative people affected?
What proactive measures did your company or you observe?
Did such inactivity have a far-reaching impact or unexpected or unintended consequences on your
business, people, industry? If so, what were they?
How did the regulation change your view of government and country?
Did you take proactive measures to deal with regulators differently in the future?
Did you attempt any legal action as a result of such inactivity? If so, what was the outcome?
How did the above make you feel?
Did the above impact your personal life, if so how and how did you deal with that?
Did the above impact the personal lives of people in your firm or other stakeholders? If so, how
and how did they deal with those impacts?
4. Please tell me about your experience regarding incentives in the above situations?
Consider the largest or two such situations that impacted your business – what were they and what
did they do to incentives?
What did that do to your business?
How were senior people affected?
How were junior and administrative people affected?
What proactive measures did your company or you observed?
Did changes to incentives have a far-reaching impact or unexpected or unintended consequences
on your business, people, industry? If so, what were they?
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How did the changes in incentives change your view of government and country?
Did you take proactive measures to deal with incentives differently in the future?
Did you attempt any legal action as a result of the regulation to protect incentives? If so, what was
the outcome?
How did the above concerning incentives make you feel?
Did the above change in incentives impact your personal life, if so how and how did you deal with
that?
Did the above change in incentives impact the personal lives of people in your firm or other
stakeholders? If so, how and how did they deal with those impacts?
5. Please consider the above responses and tell me the effect above on disruption and
innovation?
Did they cause such? Where they created in response to such? If so, did they abate matters, short
term? Long term?
What was the impact of such short term on stakeholders, business, and industry?
What was the impact of such long term on stakeholders, business, and industry?
6. Overall, what is your view of regulation and or lack of enforcement thereof?
Feel free to be prophetic, factual, sentimental, theoretical, pontificate, predictive, or prescriptive.
7. When you think about the above, is there anything in hindsight you would have done
differently?
If so, what?
8. Is there anything we have not discussed that you feel would be important to share?
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APPENDIX C: METHODS AND PROCESS
Triangulation, Ethics, and Bias Mitigation
As an initial framework to address bias, the approach for this study is based on Nagel's
(1994) value-neutrality construct, which withholds the evaluative judgment of research until it is
supported by empirical evidence. However, consistent with an Aristotelian approach of scientific
inquiry, expertise and knowledge were not suspended during the process. Nagel (1994) employs
the rigor of the scientific method, gathering relevant facts, using value neutralizing
methodologies. In this study, relevant literature and data were triangulated with third-party
information, including academic, industry, and other appropriate information and considerations,
before and after data gathering.
I gathered enough information on the interviewee and regulatory events that shape their
experience with TRAILS before the interview. However, the questions in the questionnaire were
not guided by theory or inferencing based on the preparation. They were open-ended, general,
and not specific questions, seeking facts, not opinions, the primary bias data gathering reduction
technique (Hochschild, 2009; Miles et al., 2014). All interviewees were uncompensated, willing,
and non-coerced adult participants, with no current commercial relationship and peer-level
engagement with no power imbalance. Interviews were recorded and transcribed as a bias
reduction technique, per research guidance, along with open-ended questioning (Aguinis &
Solarino, 2019; Charmaz, 2014).
The rigor in elite interviews, while typically more complex than other interviews due to
the pressure of preparation concerning the interviewee and subject matter (Hochschild, 2009),
provides a level of bias reduction. In addition, such practice allows for real-time validation, and
triangulation is afforded during the interviewee process, checking the bias of the interviewee as
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well as the researcher as there is a baseline of real evidence. Specifically, advanced preparation
was done to probe, triangulate, and understand interviewees' responses in real-time and validate
(based on purpose) and crystalize (a prism of the totality of information and interpretations).
Triangulation corroboration from different sources than from the interviewee enhances the
trustworthiness and credibility of the analysis and is a bias reduction technique (Miles et al.,
2014). Triangulation is the modus operandi approach used to diagnose data in some way. The
strategy is pattern matching, using other data sources, which provides repeated verification.
Triangulation points to theories, concepts, or ideas and rules out different conclusions (Miles et
al., 2014). Thus, data validation by reconciling interview results to source documents was
performed as necessary for bias checking (Hochschild, 2009; Marshall & Rossman, 2014; Miles
et al., 2014).
Further, preliminary interviewee responses were significant to triangulate and validate
third-party source data and literature. In general, data was compared to the literature review and
third-party sourced material in an iterative and integrated manner throughout the process. Thus,
triangulation was corroborated from different sources to the interviewee data for credibility,
validity, trustworthiness, authenticity, and importance (Miles et al., 2014). In terms of theory
building, triangulation is the modus operandi used to somehow diagnose and build upon data.
The triangulation strategy is pattern matching, using other data sources, which provides repeated
verification. Triangulation pointed to theories, concepts, or ideas for which to construct and ruled
out different conclusions for such (Miles et al., 2016).
Research suggests an additional consideration for bias checking of the researcher and
interviewee. Before starting an interview, contemplate the ‘starting and standing’ point visa vie
the interviewee and the researcher relative to power, prestige, position, and why selected. After
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the interview, reflect on any changes to that analysis and potential influencing bias in the
interview, interviewee, and researcher (Charmaz, 2014). While the information and data were
enlightening, the discussion’s professionalism, propriety, and integrity met the anticipated high
expectations of the research. There were no material changes that emerged from the interview
that were material to change the ‘starting and standing’ point of the rationale for selection.
Memoing, Note-taking, and Visualizations
Separate notes were kept throughout the process, including interviews and remembrance
of key concepts. The creation of visualizations were reviewed with advisors. In addition,
throughout the process, lengthy narrations were drafted, with more than four million words to
capture and articulate concepts gleaned from triangulation of information, data from interviews
and feedback from advisors, peer reviews, and cohorts, and reflect epiphanies, and working
through complex concepts from the data and theory building. Therefore, all information
discussed exists and is encrypted and or locked in file cabinets as required by the IRB approval.
Authenticity and Beneficence
In addition to other authentication procedures discussed, all quotes, paraphrasing, and
summaries from the data in the document were cleared with the participants to ensure the
promised anonymity and accuracy. For participation in the project, interviewees will have access
to the research. Thus, they will benefit from the direction of the report and its aim to right-size
TRAILS to create a healthy business environment.
Disconfirming Evidence
Every interview had an equal gentle push for both right-side TRAILS and wrong-sized
TRAILS. Other than that, the executives were free to discuss the TRAILS that impacted their
business. Further, the literature review addressed and considered all business sides of the
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TRAILS phenomena substantially and documented such. In terms of scope, the executives
interviewed were US-based with global experience. The literature review and analysis sought to
disconfirm and confirm evidence mainly in the U.S. I did not judge evidence as ensuring or
disconfirming. A check of theories was done to have participants, certain professors, and mentors
attempt to falsify the theories built. This process checked for the theories' propriety and provided
another check on the bias that could impair the study. In addition, I kept the primary advisor
apprised of progress and reviewed theories with specific cohorts during the entire process.
The selected executives demonstrated integrity during the process and empathized with
those harm by wrong-sized TRAILS even if they had benefitted. For example, one CEO in the
hospitality industry noted it was their best year due to government bail-out intervention (broken
window beneficiary) due to the COVID-19 event. But they said the entirety of the situation was
“absurd and unjust and will harm the country for a very long time.” This sort of integrity, which
was the norm, increased the confidence in analytic findings from the elite executives.
Validation
From the data emerged an overriding validation process and methodology. The
overriding validation of the research is the fidelity to evidenced-based truths, rationalism
empiricism, and observational empiricism. From the evidence, I used an empirical
theory-building approach for each theoretical framework principle or body of principles
or proposition.
Research Environment
The interviews took place during the COVID-19 event, the worst fiscal year since
WWII. Also, during the interview period, due to TRAILS, the largest transfer of wealth
of an estimated 40% from SME’s and their stakeholders to the government, its oligarchs,
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and its agents occurred (Goldstein, 2020; Thubron, 2020). Further, the elite executives are aware
of the degradation of the business environment over the last 50 years due to TRAILS and the
theft of existing and future business opportunities for SME’s, their stakeholders, and
entrepreneurial inventors. The COVID-19 event created an IRB regulation that no interview
could be conducted in the interviewee’s physical business environment. Thus, each interview,
which averaged over an hour and a half, took place over Zoom.
Replication
The research report provides the roadmap from the data to the theories built. If the same
access and quality of sample population and researcher and process are reversed engineered, the
research is replicable.

128

APPENDIX D: CODING
FIGURE 13: CODES FOR EACH CYCLE
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First cycle coding
SRO's have regulatory authority
Regulation reduces innovation
Regulation reduces employment
Regulation reduces incentives
Regulation uses a control mechanism over most talented
Regulation is conflicting among Fed, agencies, SRO, and stats
Regulation causes material agency issues
Regulation is used as a weapon by the knowledgeable, insiders, and corrupt
Regulation is disenfranchising youth, self-reliance, and abstract thought
Regulation is making potential producers unable to access career opportunities
Regulation would have made a different career choice
Regulation harm innovation, environment, small business, poor/MC most
Regulation is a hidden tax to pay for unlawful behavior
Regulation is destroying important industries when they are needed most
Regulation is a moral hazard
Regulation puts the government in control of every important industry
Nationalizing of private industry is a hidden regulation/ tax
Government regulation has material adverse consequence
Regulation causes black markets and workarounds
Regulation is wiping out upper and middle class/equal outcomes
Technocracy is regulatory capture of business and society
Regulation allows government to nationalize profitable industries
Regulation for the same "offering" is different - more skilled, more regulation
Direct Coercion is a form of regulation
Indirect Coercion is a form of government regulation
Skills/requirements not on par with non-governmental
Regulators have unlimited funds and threat to compliance
Regulation doesn't understand risk and reward
Regulation is written without consequential knowledge
Government creates agencies to avoid accountability
Most regulation harms business
Government use regulation to control
Regulation is stopping the capital formation
Regulation makes government the largest competitor private industries has
Regulation causes uncertainty and inability to perform
That which is regulated requires layers of reporting
Regulation includes tax, regulation, permitting, reporting, judicial, accounting
Effects of regulation not felt immediately but long term beyond disastrous
Modest regulation for few industries is appropriate
Regulation applied unevenly
Judicial System is regulation
Regulation not enforced
Regulation has the opposite effect that is stated or expected
Regulation doesn't protect citizens -far past a tipping point
Government uses regulation as a hidden tax
Agencies create SRO's as a hidden tax
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Second cycle coding
1. Healthy business environment requires individuals to make micro-decisions that maximize
perceived utility
TRAILS can cause mandating technocracy that creating sub-optimal operational outcomes
Regulation is dumbing down society, especially youth
TRAILS is degrading abstract thinking of workforces and motivation, thus business performance
The predictability of the impact of regulating technology requirements is nearly impossible,
Interplay of TRAILS and technology and abstract thinking
TRAILS is impacted knowledge creation
Most TRAILS adversely affect knowledge creation
2. Unintended consequences or unseen unintended consequences
Government under regulatory capture – the result of unintended adverse consequences
Technocracy is used regulatory capture/control of business and society
Regulation allows government to nationalize profitable industries
Regulation is destroying important industries when they are needed most
TRAILS requiring minimum benefits results in unemployment and harms business performance
TRAILS has consequences far beyond initial impact and unforeseen consequences.
Implication the USA is closer to the “devil” of collectivism due to business regulation
3. Methodological individualism exists, perhaps especially with large groups and Hayek’s
knowledge problem and the pretense of knowledge of government
Lack of transparency leading indicator of company failure (Sound Money)
There is no universal agreement of economic statistics (Sound Money)
There is little accountability or reconciliation in research information (Sound Money)
Research has issues surrounding fallacy of composition
Regulation allows government to nationalize profitable industries
TRAILS results in the mediocre government employees regulating far superior talent
Technology is being used regulatorily to replace human expertise.
Dumbing down society and practicing experts in the most vital professions needed into the future
“Mediocre” will blame capitalism for regulatory failure to pursue “hot” collectivism
Where is the USA economy Today vis-a-vie TRAILS (Sound Money)
The Constitution a Living Breathing Document (LBD) or a Republic (Constitution - Sound
Money)
Does government violate - Article I, Section 9, Clause 7 (Constitution - Sound Money)
4. Interference of the invisible hand of innovation and market. Optimal coherence,
asymmetrical antifragile knowledge acquisition, optimizes, outcomes
Direct and indirect Coercion is a form of regulation (Propaganda)
Regulation put government in control of every important industry
Government is businesses’ largest partner and has power over all firms via TRAILS
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Integrated/integral/multidiscipline unbiased analytical methodology is needed
Disproportionate and uneven impact of TRAILS on small business vs. big business
Government to perform their appropriate role
Public, private partnerships are a form of inappropriate government regulations
There is a minimum set of regulations necessary for businesses to compete effectively and thrive.
Government can harm business overregulation
Some level of TRAILS is needed for commerce, and additional regulation harms small business
Impact of wrong sized TRAILS distrust in government
Assume further at some point regulation reaches a point in which it hits 100% and eliminates GDP
5. Only the government can legally provide enforcement in the area of commerce
Regulation for the same "offering" is different - more skilled, more regulation
TRAILS can use Coercion to implement a gray area of regulations not in favor of business firms
TRAILS cause a lack of enforcement or are unevenly applied
The little-understood government inaction on TRAILS
Enforce appropriate regulations sufficiently and evenly to various participants in business
Not enforcing appropriate regulation or unequal enforcement of appropriate laws is intervention
Government to preoccupied with inappropriate regulations to do their proper role in government
6. Misunderstanding winner and losers
Regulation is a hidden tax to pay for unlawful behavior
Regulation is moral hazard/allow the vilifying of the most productive
Nationalizing of private industry is a hidden regulation/ tax
TRAILS can cause harm when regulators become your competitor
Impact of wrong-side TRAILS anti-competitive markets, commerce
Result of wrong sized TRAILS unequal opportunity
The appropriateness or not and of government action and inaction for stakeholders
Inappropriately overregulate business and thus harm business performance
Third cycle coding
1) Most TRAILS are wrong-sized.
Matrix (Initial Anthropomorphic right-sizing tool)
2) Government has a critical role in business
3) Good intentions adverse consequences
4) Preponderance of Intervention TRAILS or uneven enforcement is adverse
5) Government does not belong in industries outside its charter
6) All wrong-size TRAILS violate the Constitution
7) Sound microeconomic technology enhances Founding Documents
Principles (Initial)
8) Knowledge creates innovation, causes economic growth and thus wealth
9) Most TRAILS impact knowledge creation
10) Most TRAILS have unintended adverse consequences
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11) Decoherence of individuals in government don’t have consequential knowledge
12) TRAILS can interfere with knowledge creation MARKETS
13) Not enforcing good TRAILS adverse impacts
Propositions (Initial)
14) Incentives and business performance aren’t. TRAILS calculus.
15) Right-sizing only happens by considering and imagining beyond one level of implications.
16) Unseen unintended adverse consequences from wrong-sized TRAILS disrupt entrepreneurial
innovation at the industry levels.
17) Inaction on right-sized TRAILS has the same consequences as wrong-sized.
Implications (Initial)
18) Absent of transparent regulating bodies across industries
19) Adverse impact of picking winners and losers eliminate picking winners and losers.
20) Adverse impact of ongoing government interest in private industry (knowledge destruction)
21) Adverse impact of unconstitutional currency
Founding Documents coding
1) Transparency
2) Government’s role provides for the protection of security and the individual’s rights granted by
God
3) Justice
4) Private property and the cornerstone of Liberty
5) Disruptive innovation
6) Competitive free markets
7) Equal opportunity
8) Business form (Contractual)
9) Antecedent (Natural Law – Individualism)
Microeconomic apodictic axioms coding
1) seen consequences, unseen and seen unintended consequences of TRAILS
2) opportunity costs of TRAILS
3) weakness of deterministic modeling for TRAILS
4) divinity of the individual (limbic system- individuals unpredictable, nonlinear, within
parameters),
5) methodological individualism exists even, perhaps especially, within a group
6) individuals are not static and will react to TRAILS in a manner most advantageous to self
7) continuous iteration of the business environment
8) winner and looser theory of TRAILS
9) wrong sized TRAILS reduce GDP by at least the full measure of the cost
10) the invisible hand of commerce
11) Gödel and Turning impossibility of AI as sentient
12) knowledge creates wealth; reduced knowledge impairs wealth
13) the fallacy of well-intentioned collectivists “plausible one narrative explanation of the gap
theory.”
14) the process of regulatory capture and industrial capture
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15) democracies sacrifice the individual for seen & do not understand the invisible opportunity
16) business creates all civil elevations
17) the government will employ its controlled assets to gaslight the mob against the individual and
OC
18) only the government can legally provide enforcement in certain areas of commerce.
19) business choice is a trade-off of cost and benefits of equal due to conservation's immutable
law.
20) each party seeks to maximize utility in a trade
21) sensible TRAILS dilemma decisions are made to maximize knowledge creation with
incentives
22) government only destroys value outside its core charter.
23) humans are the most remarkable creation; only they can create efficient markets, not perfect.
24) modeling nor human-made machine-like “AI” is always deterministic, not sentient.
25) individuals only create prosperous change with knowledge, never will be able to fully articulate
26) iteration of time is constantly and continuously transforming, iterating, in motion with
knowledge
27) unseen consequences of TRAILS, the magnitude of opportunity costs
28) wrong-sized TRAILS beget more wrong-size TRAILS
29) individuals in government do not understand business nor economics near the level
practitioners
30) individuals in government act in self-interest, do not serve the public or the business
environment
Contemporary TRAILS Paradigm (CTP) codes
1) The system aims to create a business environment of optimal system coherence for the smallest
minority to promote equal opportunity.
2) When aggregated, the closer to fulfilling each individual's aim, the closer the business system
is to its core cultural imperative.
3) The core cultural imperative is risk-adjusted, antifragile, maximized pursuit of happiness of the
individual that optimizes the business system.
4) Whenever observed in an individual’s sphere of influence, another individual struggle, and the
individual has the power to help. Therefore, the individual should do so.
5) However, no intervening individual or party has the right to coerce the individual to do so.
6) Helping provides knowledge that creates more wisdom, invigorating as do many other actions,
the business environment, and the virtuous optimization of system coherence.
7) The choice to act is solely the individual’s decision.
Matrix Codes
1) TRAILS can harm the business if they are in an inappropriate area or inappropriate
overregulation
2) business by not enforcing appropriate regulations or through unequal enforcement of laws
3) competitive (anti-competitive) markets
4) commerce to succeed (fail)
5) equal (unequal) opportunity
6) high (Low) trust between government and commerce
7) optimal (sub-optimal) business performance
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